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I.   INTRODUCTION
 On October 11, 2006, Adam Gadahn, also known as Azzam al-
Amriki or “Azzam the American,” was indicted by a federal grand 
jury on charges of treason.1 The indictment alleged that Gadahn, an 
American citizen, “knowingly adhered to an enemy of the United 
States, namely, al-Qaeda, and gave al-Qaeda aid and comfort, within 
the United States and elsewhere, with intent to betray the United 
States.”2 This charge was based on Gadahn’s participation in several 
videotapes produced by al-Qaeda between October 2004 and Septem-
ber 2006, in which he appeared with al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin 
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, espoused his support for the terrorist 
organization, praised the attacks of September 11th and the bomb-
ings in London and Madrid, and threatened future attacks against 
the United States.3 Notably, Gadahn was not in United States custo-
dy when the indictment was issued and currently remains at large.4
 While newsworthy at the time of its announcement, the Gadahn 
indictment is particularly significant because it marks the first time 
in over fifty years that the U.S. government has charged someone 
                                                                                                                    
 1. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Citizen Indicted on Treason, Material Sup-
port Charges for Providing Aid and Comfort to Al Qaeda (Oct. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_nsd_695.html [hereinafter Gadahn Press Re-
lease]. Gadahn was also charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist or-
ganization, specifically al-Qaeda, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, as well as aiding and 
abetting in connection with the material support charge. First Superseding Indictment at 
9, United States v. Gadahn, No. SA CR 05-254 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2005) [hereinafter Gadahn 
Indictment], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/adam_indictment.pdf. 
 2. Gadahn Indictment, supra note 1, at 3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000) (“Whoev-
er, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their ene-
mies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of trea-
son and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under 
this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the 
United States.”). 
 3. Gadahn Indictment, supra note 1, at 3-8; see also Gadahn Press Release, supra
note 1. Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution’s Treason Clause, which states that “[n]o Person 
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt 
Act, or on Confession in open Court,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1, the indictment alleges 
five overt acts observed by at least two witnesses, namely five separate videotapes in 
which Gadahn appeared. Gadahn Indictment, supra note 1, at 3-8. 
 4. Gadahn Press Release, supra note 1. 
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with treason.5 The last time an American was indicted for treason 
was October 27, 1954.6
 The Gadahn indictment calls for a dusting off of the Treason 
Clause, including a reexamination of modern (i.e., post-World War II) 
treason jurisprudence. As Professor Carlton Larson recently ob-
served: “The Treason Clause is one of the great forgotten clauses of 
the Constitution . . . . Despite occasional flurries of public interest in 
the subject . . . legal scholarship on issues relating to treason is basi-
cally moribund.”7 Several decades after its initial publication, Profes-
sor James Willard Hurst’s work on the law of treason continues to 
dominate the field it essentially created.8 Hurst, like most other trea-
son commentators, focused on pre-World War II issues, such as trea-
                                                                                                                    
 5. Id. (“Gadahn is the first person to be charged with treason against the United 
States since the World War II era.”); see also George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Trea-
son, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611, 1612 (2004) (“The last time the government prosecuted acts of 
adhering to the enemy was during World War II.”); Dan Eggen & Karen DeYoung, U.S. 
Supporter of Al-Qaeda Is Indicted on Treason Charge, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A3 
(noting that the treason charge against Gadahn makes “him the first American to be 
charged with that crime in half a century”). 
 6. See United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 184 (D. Md. 1955). Sgt. John Provoo 
was originally indicted for treason in 1949. Id. He was convicted by a jury on March 12, 
1953, for his conduct as an American prisoner of war while held in Japan. United States v. 
Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 532-33 (2d Cir. 1954). He allegedly offered his services to the Japa-
nese military, made two radio broadcasts from Tokyo on behalf of the Japanese, and acted 
as a “stool pigeon,” resulting in the death of a fellow prisoner of war. Id. at 532; Justice De-
nied, TIME, Oct. 31, 1955, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,807843,00.html. Provoo’s conviction was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1954 on evidentiary and venue grounds. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. at 184. The United 
States sought a new indictment, which was returned by a grand jury on October 27, 1954. 
Id. Later, the District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the indictment on the 
grounds that Provoo’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. Id. at 203. 
 The last treason conviction to be upheld was in 1952. See Kawakita v. United States, 
343 U.S. 717, 717 (1952). Kawakita was indicted on November 14, 1947, for forcing Ameri-
can prisoners of war to mine and smelt nickel ore in Japan while serving as an interpreter 
for the Japanese. See United States v. Kawakita, 96 F. Supp. 824, 825, 837 (S.D. Cal. 1950). 
 7. Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy 
Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 865-66 (2006). Larson also remarks that 
“many well-trained lawyers might be surprised to learn that [the Treason Clause] even ex-
ists. Law school courses in constitutional law and criminal law ignore the subject entirely.” 
Id. at 865. Similarly, Professor George P. Fletcher states that “[t]he literature on treason is 
scant.” Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1611 n.2. Like Larson, Fletcher laments that “[c]asebooks 
ignore the offense [of treason]. Treatise writers show little interest. The tendency to ignore 
treason in theorizing about criminal law testifies to its atavistic character.” Id. at 1619 
(footnote omitted). 
 8. See Larson, supra note 7, at 866 (“Apart from the seminal work of James Willard 
Hurst many decades ago, there is virtually no scholarship engaging doctrinal issues in 
American treason law.” (footnote omitted)); Marvin R. Summers, The Law of Treason in the 
United States: Collected Essays, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1449, 1449 (1975) (reviewing JAMES 
WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: COLLECTED ESSAYS (1971)) 
(noting that at the time Hurst’s book was published, the “literature on treason against the 
United States [was] extremely sparse”). Hurst’s book is mostly a compilation of earlier law 
review articles he wrote a few decades prior to the publication of his book, supplemented 
with a new chapter analyzing the treason cases from 1945 to 1970. HURST, supra, at xi. 
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son’s development in English law preceding the American Revolu-
tion, the drafting of the Treason Clause at the Constitutional Con-
vention, and its treatment by American jurists during the nineteenth 
century.9 In light of this paucity of scholarship, especially regarding 
modern treason jurisprudence, a thorough reassessment of the law of 
treason is long overdue. 
 Since World War II, the law of treason has witnessed two impor-
tant developments. First, in 1945, the United States Supreme Court 
decided a case involving a treason conviction for the first time in its 
history: Cramer v. United States.10 That decision also marked the 
first time the Court interpreted the meaning of the Treason Clause’s 
overt act requirement and its “adhering to their enemies, giving 
them aid and comfort” provision.11 Second, until the indictment of 
Gadahn, treason prosecutions had disappeared after the early 
1950s.12 Although treason was never a popular charge for federal 
prosecutors, treason prosecutions—except for the last fifty years—
attended most armed conflicts in American history, including the 
Whiskey Rebellion, War of 1812, Civil War, Philippine insurrections, 
World War I, and World War II.13 Indeed, between 1942 and 1954, 
                                                                                                                    
 9. See generally HURST, supra note 8. For other commentators who have similarly fo-
cused on the earlier history of treason law, see for example BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE 
AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON: REVOLUTIONARY AND EARLY NATIONAL ORIGINS (1964);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 216-17 (3d ed. 2005); L.M. Hill, 
The Two-Witness Rule in English Treason Trials: Some Comments on the Emergence of 
Procedural Law, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1968); and Walter G. Simon, The Evolution of 
Treason, 35 TUL. L. REV. 669 (1961). 
 10. 325 U.S. 1 (1945). The Court would later decide two more treason cases: Haupt v. 
United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947), and Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952). 
 11. Although the Court had decided one other case involving treason, see Ex Parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), it did not involve the merits of a treason prosecution. 
Rather, the petitioners in Bollman had not yet been prosecuted for treason; they had only 
been detained. See id. at 125 (“This being a mere inquiry, which, without deciding upon 
guilt, precedes the institution of a prosecution, the question to be determined is, whether 
the accused shall be discharged or held to trial . . . .”). 
 In Bollman, the Court first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to issue a writ of 
habeas corpus. Id. at 93-101. After holding that it indeed had jurisdiction to issue such a 
writ, Chief Justice Marshall held that the petitioners should be set free since the allega-
tions, as presented, did not constitute “levying war” in accordance with the Treason 
Clause. Id. at 126-27, 136 (“To constitute that specific crime for which the prisoners now 
before the court have been committed, war must be actually levied against the United 
States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the govern-
ment of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. . . . To complete the crime of levying 
war against the United States, there must be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose 
of executing a treasonable design. . . . [T]herefore, as the crime with which the prisoners 
stand charged has not been committed, the court can only direct them to be discharged.”). 
Whereas Bollman involved the “levying war” prong of the Treason Clause, Cramer dealt 
with the separate and distinct “adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort” 
prong. See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 35-36. 
 12. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
 13. Richard Z. Steinhaus, Treason, A Brief History with Some Modern Applications,
22 BROOK. L. REV. 254, 258-263 (1955) (discussing treason prosecutions that took place in 
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eleven Americans were prosecuted for treason based on conduct 
committed during the Second World War.14 However, after 1954 not a 
single American was charged with treason until the indictment of 
Gadahn in 2006. Put another way, unlike previous conflicts, the Ko-
rean War, Vietnam War, Persian Gulf Conflict, and the Iraq War all 
failed to yield a treason prosecution.15
 In light of these developments, this Article has two main objec-
tives. First, I will analyze the Court’s decision in Cramer v. United 
States. Based on internal court documents, such as draft opinions 
and private memoranda, it is clear that the Justices had more on 
their minds than the specific legal question at hand. 
 Second, I will reassess the relationship between Cramer and the 
lack of treason charges after 1954 and offer an explanation for the 
disappearance of treason prosecutions until the indictment of Ga-
dahn in 2006. Specifically, I will highlight the significance of a tradi-
tionally underappreciated portion of the Cramer decision: the Court’s 
statement that Congress enjoys great latitude in proscribing trea-
sonous conduct under different headings. These passages not only 
help explain the lack of treason prosecutions after 1954, but they also 
shed light on an issue that has resurfaced from time to time without 
much fanfare. By examining the link between Cramer and the lack of 
treason prosecutions after 1954, one can better understand the state 
of treason as it exists today. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays the necessary foun-
dation by detailing the facts and procedural history of the landmark 
Cramer decision. Part III discusses the most common explanation as 
to why the Supreme Court decided Cramer the way it did and then 
explores the weaknesses of this view. Part IV reexamines what moti-
vated the Justices in Cramer and offers an alternative explanation 
for why the Court decided, and divided, as it did. Specifically, I posit 
that the Justices were largely influenced by their attitudes on two is-
sues: (1) the degree to which Congress may “circumvent” the Treason 
Clause by proscribing conduct covered by treason under a different 
heading (and without the same procedural safeguards); and (2) the 
degree to which the Framers intended treason prosecutions to be ex-
ceedingly rare and difficult. 
 Part V discusses the conventional wisdom regarding the lack of 
treason charges since 1954 and how the Court’s decision in Cramer 
                                                                                                                    
connection with the Whiskey Rebellion, the War of 1812, the Civil War, the Philippine in-
surrections, World War I, and World War II). Most estimates place the total number of 
treason prosecutions before the end of World War II at about thirty five. See, e.g., HURST,
supra note 8, at 260. 
 14. See HURST, supra note 8, at 236, 265-67. 
 15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
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contributed to the disappearance of treason prosecutions. Part V also 
explores the weaknesses of this generally accepted narrative. Part VI 
offers an alternative account of why treason prosecutions ended after 
the World War II era and reexamines Cramer’s role in that develop-
ment. Specifically, I argue that a confluence of factors—namely Cra-
mer, Congress, and prosecutorial discretion—was responsible for the 
lack of treason prosecutions after 1954. The Cramer decision was 
significant in two ways. First, Cramer made treason harder, but not 
too hard, to prove. Second, the Court explicitly held that Congress 
could criminalize (and the Executive could prosecute) treasonous 
conduct under a separate statutory heading and without the proce-
dural safeguards required by the Constitution’s Treason Clause. This 
Part also addresses some potential critiques of my explanation. Fi-
nally, I briefly conclude with some words about the Gadahn case and 
what it might portend for treason prosecutions in the future. 
II.   THE TREASON PROSECUTION OF ANTHONY CRAMER
A.   The Case Against Cramer 
 The treason prosecution of Anthony Cramer has its roots in the 
infamous Nazi Saboteur Affair. In 1942, seven German soldiers tra-
veled by submarine and secretly landed on the east coast of the Unit-
ed States with plans to destroy American industrial war facilities.16
The saboteurs were eventually caught, tried by military tribunal, 
and sentenced to either death or imprisonment.17 The Supreme Court 
denied the saboteurs’ habeas corpus petitions in Ex Parte Quirin.18
 Anthony Cramer was not a saboteur but rather a friend of one. 
Cramer was born in Germany and, as a teenager, was conscripted in-
to the German army during World War I. In 1925, Cramer moved to 
the United States, and he became a naturalized citizen in 1936. 
While living in the United States, he befriended a fellow German na-
tional named Werner Thiel, who would later become one of the Nazi 
saboteurs. They became roommates and entered into a joint business 
venture that eventually failed. Both men joined the Friends of New 
Germany, a predecessor to the German-American Bund. Cramer 
                                                                                                                    
 16. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1942). 
 17. See LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND 
AMERICAN LAW (2003). 
 18. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20. One of the saboteurs, Herbert Hans Haupt, may 
have been an American citizen. See id. The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice 
Stone, noted that it was permissible for Haupt to be tried by a military commission as an 
unlawful belligerent, instead of by a civilian court as a committer of treason, precisely be-
cause the law of war was a distinct creature with its own set of rules: “For that reason, 
even when committed by a citizen, the offense [committed by the accused] is distinct from 
the crime of treason defined in Article III, § 3 of the Constitution, since the absence of uni-
form essential to one is irrelevant to the other.” See id. at 38. 
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withdrew before the organization became the Bund, but Thiel re-
mained active in the group until he returned to Germany in 1941.19
 On June 22, 1942, an unsigned, handwritten note was slipped un-
der the door of Cramer’s New York City apartment. It asked him to 
go to the information booth of Grand Central Station and meet 
“Franz from Chicago” that evening. When Cramer arrived at the lo-
cation, he was surprised to see his old friend Thiel. After talking over 
drinks in a public place, “Cramer suggested that he invite Thiel’s 
fiancée Emma (Norma) Kopp” to visit them from Connecticut. Cra-
mer met with Thiel on two more occasions in the following days at 
the Twin Oaks Inn and at Thompson’s Cafeteria near Grand Central 
Station.20 At the second of these meetings, Thiel gave Cramer his 
money belt, which contained over $3600 in U.S. currency. Cramer 
kept $200 for himself (an amount Thiel supposedly owed him from a 
previous debt), put $160 aside in case Thiel should need it quickly, 
and placed the remaining amount in a safety deposit box.21
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents following Thiel had 
observed, but did not overhear, the two meetings with Cramer.22
Shortly after the final meeting, Cramer was arrested.23 After initially 
lying to the FBI in hopes of protecting Thiel, Cramer eventually re-
canted and gave a detailed statement about what had taken place be-
tween him and Thiel.24
 At the time of arrest, the government had not yet decided how to 
charge Cramer for his dealings with Thiel.25 The two most likely op-
tions were trading with the enemy and treason (for giving aid and 
comfort to the enemy).26 Although “[h]andling the saboteurs’ money 
clearly violated the Trading with the Enemy Act,” staff attorneys 
within the Department of Justice (DOJ) “differed over the wisdom of 
pressing more serious charges of treason.”27 After an internal debate, 
the Department of Justice decided to prosecute Cramer (along with 
nearly a dozen other Americans suspected of harboring other Nazi 
saboteurs) for treason.28 This “policy decision” came from “higher au-
                                                                                                                    
 19. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Advocacy in Constitutional Choice: The Cramer Treason 
Case, 1942-1945, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 375, 378. 
 20. Id. at 378-79. The leader of the Nazi saboteurs, Edward Kerling, also attended one 
of the meetings. Id.
 21. Id. at 379.  
 22. Id.
 23. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 5 (1945). 
 24. Howard, supra note 19, at 379. 
 25. Id. at 380. 
 26. Id. at 380-81. 
 27. Id.
 28. Id. at 381. 
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thority,” which was most likely Attorney General Francis Biddle.29
On August 12, 1942, several weeks after Cramer’s arrest, the DOJ 
announced it would seek indictments against those who assisted the 
saboteurs in Brooklyn, Chicago, and New York, including Cramer.30
 Cramer’s trial began on November 9, 1942.31 He was represented 
by appointed counsel, Harold Medina, who would later serve as a 
federal district and circuit court judge.32 During the course of the tri-
al, the United States Attorney presented evidence to the jury that 
indicated Cramer had remained sympathetic to his homeland.33 For 
instance, Cramer had written letters to his family and friends in 
Germany that criticized American foreign policy, expressed support 
for Germany in its fight against other European nations (this was be-
fore Pearl Harbor), and bragged about refusing to contribute to the 
American war effort by not working at a war materials plant or buy-
ing war bonds.34 Thiel’s former fiancée, Norma Kopp, also testified on 
behalf of the government.35 She explained that Cramer “told her that 
Thiel had landed from a U-boat off Florida, that he had brought over 
money from the German Government, and that he got instructions 
from a ‘sitz,’ a hide-out, in the Bronx.”36
 Cramer’s chief defense was that he lacked the treasonous intent 
necessary to be convicted since he did not intend to betray his newly-
adopted country.37 Cramer argued, contrary to the testimony offered 
by Kopp, that he was not aware of Thiel’s eventual plan to destroy 
war facilities and that his simple meeting with an old friend proved 
nothing more than the friendship between Cramer and Thiel.38 Cra-
mer also claimed that he merely wanted to recover some money Thiel 
owed him.39 Finally, Cramer explained his earlier false statements to 
the FBI, in which he lied about Thiel’s real name and to whom the 
                                                                                                                    
 29. See id. (“As George A. McNulty, the Alien Property Custodian, argued to Attorney 
General Biddle, the public would understand commuting the sentences of informers for 
their testimony but not leniency toward collaborators in their midst who were ‘worse than 
those they sought to help.’ ”). 
 30. Id.
 31. Id.
 32. Id. at 376. 
 33. Id. at 382. 
 34. Id. at 382-83. In one letter to a family member, Cramer said, “ ‘Personally, I 
should not care at all to be misused by the American army as a world conqueror.’ ” Id.
 35. See id. at 383. 
 36. United States v. Cramer, 137 F.2d 888, 892 (2d Cir. 1943). FBI Special Agent Os-
tholthoff also testified that Cramer admitted to him during the interrogation that he knew 
Thiel was “on a mission for the German Government and that he [Cramer] thought it was 
to stir up unrest among the people and probably spread propaganda.” Id.
 37. See Howard, supra note 19, at 383. 
 38. See id.
 39. Id.
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money truly belonged, as an ill-conceived desire to protect his friend 
from being punished as a draft dodger.40
 In addition to claiming he lacked the requisite intent, Cramer ar-
gued that the overt acts submitted to the jury were constitutionally 
insufficient to sustain a conviction for giving aid and comfort to the 
enemy (i.e., treason).41 Although Cramer was originally charged with 
ten overt acts of treason, only three were acts to which two witnesses 
testified: the two meetings with Thiel and the false statements Cra-
mer made to the FBI after his arrest.42 Consequently, these were the 
only three acts submitted to the jury.43
 Cramer based his argument on the Constitution’s Treason Clause, 
which provides as follows: “Treason against the United States, shall 
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their 
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted 
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same 
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”44 Cramer argued that the 
Constitution required that the overt acts testified to by two witnesses 
must openly manifest treason on their face and that the acts submit-
ted to the jury were not of that sort.45 The government countered by 
contending that the overt act requirement for treason was akin to the 
overt act requirement for conspiracy—the act need only be proof of a 
step toward the conspiratorial aim, even if the act itself is innocuous 
on its face.46
 The trial judge, Judge Henry Goddard, agreed with the govern-
ment and found the overt acts to be constitutionally sufficient and 
submitted the case to the jury.47 After deliberating, the jury returned 
a guilty verdict, and Judge Goddard sentenced Cramer to forty-five 
years imprisonment and fined him $10,000.48 Judge Goddard refused 
to impose the death penalty, however, because he believed that  
Cramer had no more guilty knowledge of any subversive purposes 
on the part of Thiel and Kerling than a vague idea that they came 
here for the purpose of organizing pro-German propaganda and 
agitation. If there were any proof that they had confided in him 
                                                                                                                    
 40. Cramer, 137 F.2d at 891-92. 
 41. Howard, supra note 19, at 384. 
 42. Id.
 43. Id. Notably, the act of handling Thiel’s money was not submitted as an overt act of 
treason. Id.; see also Cramer, 325 U.S. at 35-37. 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
 45. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 6 (1945). 
 46. See id. at 7. 
 47. Howard, supra note 19, at 384. With respect to the intent issue, Judge Goddard 
instructed the jury to acquit Cramer if they believed he “acted solely out of friendship for 
Thiel and Kerling or lacked guilty knowledge of their hostile purpose.” Id. at 386. 
 48. Id. at 387.  
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what their real purposes were, or that he knew or believed what 
they really were, I should not hesitate to impose the death penalty.49
 On appeal to the Second Circuit, Cramer made three principal ar-
guments. First, as he emphasized at trial, Cramer claimed that he 
lacked the treasonable intent necessary for a conviction.50 The Second 
Circuit rejected this argument, noting that from the record, “the jury 
could properly find that [Cramer] knew some improper enterprise 
was afoot and that he intended to aid the enemy in its prosecution.”51
 Second, Cramer asserted that he was unduly prejudiced by the  
inappropriate admission of certain pieces of evidence.52 In particular, 
Cramer challenged the admission of testimony about the Nazi  
saboteurs’ background and training, statements from some of the 
aforementioned letters, and a marked Constitution found in Cra-
mer’s room that had several clauses, including the Treason Clause, 
bracketed in ink.53 The Second Circuit summarily rejected each of 
these claims.54
 Third, Cramer contended that the overt acts submitted to the jury 
were constitutionally insufficient since they did not openly manifest 
treason (that is, the acts on their face did not show treasonable in-
tent).55 In making this argument, Cramer relied on dicta from United 
States v. Robinson,56 a district court opinion by Judge Learned Hand. 
In that case, Judge Hand rejected the analogy to conspiracy law and 
opined that an overt act of treason must “manifest a criminal inten-
tion” in a way so that its “traitorous character” does not “depend[] 
upon a covert design.”57 Like the district court below, the Second Cir-
                                                                                                                    
 49. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 6; see also Howard, supra note 19, at 387. 
 50. United States v. Cramer, 137 F.2d 888, 892 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 51. Id.
 52. See id. at 897-98. 
 53. Id.
 54. Id.
 55. Id. at 893-94. 
 56. 259 F. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); see also Cramer, 137 F.2d at 895 n.3. 
 57. Robinson, 259 F. at 690 (internal quotations omitted) (“It is true that in prosecu-
tions for conspiracy under our federal statute it is well settled that any step in perfor-
mance of the conspiracy is enough, though it is innocent except for its relation to the 
agreement. I doubt very much whether that rule has any application to the case of trea-
son . . . . Lord Reading in his charge in Casement’s Case uses language which accords with 
my understanding: ‘Overt acts are such acts as manifest a criminal intention and tend to-
wards the accomplishment of the criminal object. They are acts by which the purpose is 
manifested and the means by which it is intended to be fulfilled.’ Therefore I have the 
gravest doubt of the sufficiency of the first and second overt acts of the first count and of 
those of the second count, which consist of acts that do not openly manifest any treason. 
Their traitorous character depends upon a covert design, and as such it is difficult for me 
to see how they can conform to the requirement. However, the point is not necessary to a 
decision of the case . . . .”). One district court accepted Judge Hand’s formulation and dis-
missed an indictment for treason because the alleged overt act did not openly manifest 
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cuit rejected Cramer’s argument (and the dicta from Judge Hand) as 
contrary to established authority and found the overt acts to be con-
stitutionally sufficient: “[A] treasonable intent need but be mani-
fested by an overt act . . . . The act in and of itself may be innocent; 
the intent with which it is committed is shown by all the surrounding 
circumstances, proof of which separately does not require the testi-
mony of two witnesses.”58 Having rejected each of Cramer’s argu-
ments on appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.59
B.   The Supreme Court’s Decision in Cramer
 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ments in Cramer v. United States on March 9, 1944.60 Believing his 
constitutional claims to be relatively weak, especially in light of the 
Second Circuit’s firm rejection of them, Cramer’s defense “stressed” 
the evidentiary arguments, which were thought to have a better 
chance of success.61 Aside from Cramer’s additional emphasis on the 
evidentiary issues, both Cramer and the government made essential-
ly the same arguments before the Supreme Court as they had at the 
Second Circuit. 
 In a conference held March 13, 1944, the Justices overwhelmingly 
voted to reverse the treason conviction based on the improper admis-
sion of prejudicial evidence. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and 
seven of his colleagues—Justices Owen Roberts, Hugo Black, William 
Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, Frank Murphy, and Wi-
ley Rutledge—all favored reversal; only Justice Stanley Reed voted to 
affirm the treason conviction.62 Chief Justice Stone assigned Justice 
Black the task of writing the opinion of the Court.63
 The next day, Chief Justice Stone proposed, as he had probably 
done at the initial conference, that the Court also address the case’s 
constitutional issues, including the sufficiency of the overt acts sub-
mitted to the jury.64 After exchanging notes with Justice Douglas on 
                                                                                                                    
treason. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1945) (citing United States v. Leiner 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (unreported)). 
 58. Cramer, 137 F.2d at 894-95. 
 59. Id. at 888, 898. 
 60. Howard, supra note 19, at 393; see also Cramer v. United States, 320 U.S. 730 
(1943) (granting certiorari). 
 61. See Howard, supra note 19, at 391. 
 62. Wiley B. Rutledge, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Conference Notes on U.S. 
v. Cramer (undated) (Wiley B. Rutledge Papers, Box 112, Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division); see also Howard, supra note 19, at 394. 
 63. See William O. Douglas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Case Notecard on 
No. 13 — Cramer v. United States (October Term 1944) (William O. Douglas Papers, Box 
112, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division); see also Howard, supra note 19, at 394. 
 64. See Letter from William O. Douglas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Har-
lan F. Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 15, 1944) (William O. Douglas Pa-
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whether the Court should reach the constitutional issues,65 Chief 
Justice Stone sent a memorandum to all the Justices expressing his 
fear that  
if we decide this case on the evidence points alone it may come 
back a second time when we would be forced to decide whether the 
overt acts charged must, by themselves, standing alone, manifest a 
treasonable purpose, and that it may be wise to decide that  
question now so that the jury may be properly instructed on a  
new trial.66
If Cramer’s conviction were reversed solely on evidentiary grounds, 
he could still be retried by the government. Presuming such a retrial 
would yield another successful conviction, Chief Justice Stone feared 
that the case would soon be back before the Court. In light of his de-
sire to reach the constitutional issues, Chief Justice Stone notified 
his fellow Justices that he had asked Justice Black to “postpone writ-
ing the opinion until we can consider this aspect of the case at the 
next Conference.”67
 Justices Douglas,68 Roberts,69 and Frankfurter70 all opposed, as 
they had at the initial conference,71 reaching the constitutional issues 
                                                                                                                    
pers, Box 112, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division) (“I was talking at luncheon yes-
terday with some of the Brethren about the Cramer case and your suggestion that it might 
be desirable to pass on the substantive question of treason instead of writing the opinion 
on evidence questions alone.”). 
 65. See id.; Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Wil-
liam O. Douglas, Assoc. Justice, U.S Supreme Court (Mar. 15, 1944) (William O. Douglas 
Papers, Box 112, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). 
 66. Memorandum from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, on No. 
406 — Cramer v. United States to the Conference (Mar. 22, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson Pa-
pers, Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). 
 67. See Memorandum from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,  
to the Court (undated) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 131, Library of Congress, Manu-
script Division). 
 68. Douglas, supra note 64 (“I rather thought that it would be desirable to . . . not 
reach the treason question. My reasons are as follows: Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment 
clearly raise the troublesome question which we discussed at length in the Conference. But 
Count 10 is plainly valid whatever view may be taken of the meaning of treason. Hence, it 
may very well be that if there is a new trial, the Government, in view of the apparent diffi-
culties on Counts 1 and 2, will try it on Count 10 alone. At least we do not have a situation 
where a new trial will inevitably raise the questions which we reserve. It seemed to me 
that that would be the more desirable course than to reach the substantive points at this 
time and inevitably get a close division of views on an important question in the middle of 
the war.”). 
 69. Letter from Owen Roberts, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert H. Jack-
son, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 27, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 
131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division) (“I feel that the reversal in this case ought 
to go on the trial rulings alone and that we ought not, at this time, to decide so vital a con-
stitutional issue as the parties wish us to decide.”). 
 70. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert H. 
Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 27, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, 
Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division) (“I will not disappoint you by my foo-
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as suggested by Chief Justice Stone. Justice Murphy also appeared, 
at least initially, to resist reaching the constitutional question.72
 In the meantime, Justice Black changed his mind and switched 
his vote: he was now in favor of affirming the conviction.73 In a letter 
to Chief Justice Stone, Justice Black explained that from oral argu-
ment he had “gathered the impression that there had been an inex-
cusable accumulation of evidence concerning the conspiracy and ac-
tivities of the saboteurs.”74 Upon further review of the record, howev-
er, he now believed that “Cramer was given a fair trial. Able counsel 
appointed for him took advantage of every point that could be sug-
gested in his favor” and “the jury’s verdict was justified by the evi-
dence.”75 Given Justice Black’s switch, Chief Justice Stone reassigned 
the opinion of the Court to Justice Jackson in early April 1944.76
 While the Court was still debating whether to address the subs-
tantive constitutional questions, both Justice Jackson and Justice 
Black circulated draft opinions on the nonconstitutional issues. Jus-
tice Jackson attached a memorandum to his draft opinion in which 
he expressed support for Chief Justice Stone’s suggestion to decide 
the constitutional questions: “The conviction grows upon me that we 
may be subject to just criticism if we do not follow the suggestion of 
the Chief Justice and decide the question which this opinion re-
serves.”77 In his draft opinion, Justice Jackson concluded by noting 
the division within the Court on whether to decide the constitutional 
issue:  
A majority of this Court think that in view of our agreement that 
this conviction cannot stand . . . it is not necessary or appropriate 
now to decide this constitutional question [about the sufficiency of 
                                                                                                                    
lish adherence to my conviction that not even the Cramer case calls for a decision on a con-
stitutional issue when rulings on evidence present errors that call for reversal.”). 
 71. Rutledge, supra note 62. 
 72. Id.
 73. Howard, supra note 19, at 396. 
 74. Letter from Hugo Black, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harlan F. Stone, 
Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 25, 1944) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 
272, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
 75. Id. Justice Black also remarked that if “a conviction is not to be sustained on evi-
dence such as the government produced here, I doubt if there could be many convictions for 
treason unless American citizens were actually found in the Army of the enemy.” Id.
 76. Douglas, supra note 63. According to Justice Douglas’s notes, Justice Jackson was 
assigned the opinion on April 3, 1944. Id.
 77. Memorandum from Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, on 
No. 406—Cramer v. United States to the Conference (Apr. 24, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson 
Papers, Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). Justice Jackson articulated 
three reasons for reaching the constitutional issues: the Second Circuit had decided the 
constitutional issues and the petition for certiorari highlighted them, there was a conflict 
in the lower courts (including the aforementioned opinion of Judge Hand), and the “ques-
tion is certainly squarely presented by this case . . . in a clean-cut fashion.” Id.
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the overt act]. Some of us think otherwise, but defer to the majori-
ty and leave consideration of the question to another time.78
 Justices Frankfurter and Roberts disapproved of this closing  
paragraph,79 and Chief Justice Stone drafted a short concurrence  
in which he stated that he was “of the opinion that this Court should, 
for the instruction of the trial court in the event of a new trial,  
rule on the issue raised with respect to the overt acts charged in  
the indictment.”80
 On May 11, 1944, Justice Black circulated his dissent.81 After 
reading the draft dissent, Justice Douglas notified Black that he 
thought it was “a very good job [and to] [c]ount me in the dissent.”82
The once 8-1 majority was now 6-3 in favor of reversal (with Justices 
Black and Douglas now joining Justice Reed in the minority).  
 In the conference after Black’s dissent was circulated, Chief Jus-
tice Stone finally prevailed and the Court ordered reargument on the 
constitutional issues. On May 15, 1944, Justice Jackson circulated 
the proposed order.83 In its final form, published May 22, 1944, the 
order stated: 
 This case is restored to the docket and assigned for reargument 
during the first week of argument in the October Term, 1944. The 
Court does not desire further argument on the admissibility of evi-
dence or as to the effect of error, if any, in admitting evidence. 
 Further briefs and argument are desired as to the questions 
raised under the treason clause of the Constitution, particularly as 
to the meaning of “treason” and of “overt act” and as to the re-
quirement that such overt acts be proved by testimony of two wit-
nesses; also as to whether each overt act submitted to the jury 
complied with constitutional requirements.84
                                                                                                                    
 78. Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Draft Opinion of the 
Court in No. 406, Cramer v. United States 10 (Oct. Term 1943) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, 
Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). 
 79. Frankfurter, supra note 70 (indicating that Justice Frankfurter also noted that he 
was “not at all sure that our present division would hold after a more thorough-going his-
toric inquiry of the subject than I think has thus far been had”); Roberts, supra note 69.  
 80. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to Robert H. 
Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 28, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, 
Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). 
 81. Hugo Black, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Draft Dissent in No. 406, Cra-
mer v. United States (Oct. Term 1943) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 131, Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division). 
 82. Handwritten Note on Black’s Draft Dissent from William O. Douglas, Assoc. Jus-
tice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Hugo Black, Assoc. Justice (undated) (William O. Douglas Pa-
pers, Box 112, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). 
 83. Memorandum from Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, on 
No. 406 — Cramer v. United States to the Conference (May 15, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson 
Papers, Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). 
 84. Cramer v. United States, 64 S. Ct. 1149 (1944) (mem.). 
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 For the purposes of reargument, United States Solicitor General 
Charles Fahy commissioned a comprehensive study of the law of 
treason, which was to be an “objective and thorough analysis of trea-
son in English, American, and canon law.”85 At the request of the 
DOJ and General Fahy, the Department of the Navy assigned James 
Willard Hurst “to work for some months for the Solicitor General to 
prepare an historical appendix for the government’s brief on reargu-
ment.”86 According to General Fahy, Hurst produced a “more tho-
rough research study of the law of treason than has ever been 
made.”87 In the end, Hurst wrote a 360-page appendix for the gov-
ernment’s brief, which later became the basis of several law review 
articles and a book.88 Grateful for the historical research, the Court 
expressed its appreciation for Hurst’s scholarly contribution,89 and 
both opinions frequently made reference to the study.90
 In the briefs and during oral argument, each party asserted its 
views as to what the Treason Clause’s “overt act” requirement en-
tailed and whether the overt acts alleged against Cramer satisfied 
those conditions. Cramer essentially argued the position articulated 
by Judge Hand in Robinson—that the overt act must manifest trea-
son on its face. Under this approach, the government would have to 
prove that the overt acts testified to by two witnesses demonstrated 
both a treasonable purpose and that aid and comfort was given to the 
enemy.91 Conversely, the government argued, as it had done consis-
tently, that the overt act requirement for treason was akin to the 
overt act requirement in conspiracy law.92 According to this ap-
proach, the overt act need not show anything more than proof that 
the treasonous behavior had moved from the realm of thought to the 
                                                                                                                    
 85. Howard, supra note 19, at 398 (internal quotations omitted); see also HURST, su-
pra note 8, at vii-viii (“Solicitor General Charles Fahy put no restrictions on the materials 
or findings which [Hurst] prepared for the appendix to the government’s brief.”). 
 86. HURST, supra note 8, at vii. 
 87. See Letter from Charles Fahy, Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to E.P. Cul-
linan, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 10, 1944) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 272, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
 88. Howard, supra note 19, at 398; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 89. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 8 n.9 (1945). 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 10 n.12, 12 n.15; id. at 74-75 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 91. Howard, supra note 19, at 400-01; see also Cramer, 325 U.S. at 30-31 (“The defen-
dant especially challenges the sufficiency of the overt acts to prove treasonable intention.”). 
See generally Brief for Petitioner Pursuant to Court’s Order for Further Argument, Cramer 
v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (No. 13); Reply Brief for Petitioner, Cramer v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (No. 13).
 92. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 7.
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world of action.93 This was the position that had been adopted by the 
Second Circuit.94
 On November 18, 1944, the Justices voted in conference and nar-
rowly divided, 5-4, in favor of reversing the conviction.95 Justices 
Jackson, Frankfurter, Roberts, Murphy, and Rutledge voted to re-
verse; Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black, Douglas, and Reed 
voted to affirm.96 Only Chief Justice Stone had changed positions 
since the order for reargument was issued, and he now joined those 
in favor of affirming the conviction.97 Justice Jackson was again as-
signed the opinion, which he had actually started drafting months 
before the second set of oral arguments.98 This time around the re-
spective coalitions held together, and on April 23, 1945, the Court 
announced it was reversing the treason conviction of Anthony Cramer.99
 Speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson held that two of the three 
overt acts submitted to the jury—the two meetings with Thiel—were 
constitutionally “insufficient as proved to support the judgment of 
conviction.”100 After a lengthy analysis of the Treason Clause’s histor-
ical underpinnings, Justice Jackson remarked that “historical mate-
rials” are of “little help”101 and then observed that “[o]ur problem be-
gins where the Constitution ends. That instrument omits to specify 
what relation the indispensable overt act must sustain to the  
two elements of the offense as defined: viz., adherence and giving aid 
and comfort.”102
 Justice Jackson noted that the Founders were motivated by two 
primary concerns: “(1) perversion by established authority to repress 
peaceful political opposition; and (2) conviction of the innocent as a 
result of perjury, passion, or inadequate evidence.”103 He then suc-
                                                                                                                    
 93. See id. at 72 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
 94. See Howard, supra note 19, at 402; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See generally Brief for the United States on Reargument, Cramer v. United States, 325 
U.S. 1 (1945) (No. 13). 
 95. Douglas, supra note 63.  
 96. Id.; see also William O. Douglas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Conference 
Notes on Cramer v. United States (undated) (William O. Douglas Papers, Box 112, Library 
of Congress, Manuscript Division); Rutledge, supra note 62.  
 97. See Douglas, supra note 63. 
 98. See Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Draft Opinion for No. 
406 Cramer v. United States (July 12, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 131, Library 
of Congress, Manuscript Division); Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 
Draft Opinion for No. 406 Cramer v. United States (July 14, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson Pa-
pers, Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division) [hereinafter Jackson’s July 14, 
1944, Draft Opinion]. 
 99. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945). 
 100. Id. at 48. 
 101. Id. at 20. 
 102. Id. at 30. 
 103. Id. at 27. 
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cinctly summarized the different interpretations espoused by the 
parties and the resulting implications if the Court were to adopt them: 
 The controversy before us has been waged in terms of intentions, 
but this, we think, is the reflection of a more fundamental issue as 
to what is the real function of the overt act in convicting of treason. 
[Cramer’s] contention that [the overt act] alone and on its face 
must manifest a traitorous intention, apart from an intention to do 
the act itself, would place on the overt act the whole burden of es-
tablishing a complete treason. On the other hand, the Govern-
ment’s contention that it may prove by two witnesses an apparent-
ly commonplace and insignificant act and from other circums-
tances create an inference that the act was a step in treason and 
was done with treasonable intent really is a contention that the 
function of the overt act in a treason prosecution is almost zero. It 
is obvious that the function we ascribe to the overt act is signifi-
cant chiefly because it measures the two-witness rule protection to 
the accused and its handicap to the prosecution. If the overt act or 
acts must go all the way to make out the complete treason, the de-
fendant is protected at all points by the two-witness requirement. 
If the act may be an insignificant one, then the constitutional safe-
guards are shrunken so as to be applicable only at a point where 
they are least needed.104
 Justice Jackson then moved to the heart of the Court’s holding, 
which adopted neither party’s approach: “The very minimum func-
tion that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it 
show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a find-
ing that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy.”105
Thus, under the Court’s formulation, the overt act does not need to 
manifest a treasonous intent, but it must be an act that actually gave 
aid and comfort to the enemy. Applying this standard to Cramer’s 
case, Justice Jackson found that the two meetings with Thiel failed 
to meet this standard. According to Jackson, Thiel’s “[m]eeting with 
Cramer in public drinking places to tipple and trifle was no part of 
the saboteurs’ mission and did not advance it. It may well have been 
a digression which jeopardized its success.”106 Because the jury had 
                                                                                                                    
 104. Id. at 34. 
 105. Id.
 106. Id. at 38. Justice Jackson also remarked that there  
is no showing that Cramer gave them any information whatever of value to 
their mission or indeed that he had any to give. No effort at secrecy is shown, 
for they met in public places. Cramer furnished them no shelter, nothing that 
can be called sustenance or supplies, and there is no evidence that he gave 
them encouragement or counsel, or even paid for their drinks. 
Id. at 37. Justice Jackson contrasted the insufficiency of these overt acts with an act not 
submitted to the jury: Cramer’s taking of money from Thiel for safekeeping. Such an act 
652 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:635 
returned a general verdict, the Court held that the insufficiency of 
any of the overt acts submitted required reversal of the conviction.107
 In a passionate and harshly critical dissent, Justice Douglas as-
serted that the Court’s decision “makes the way easy for the traitor, 
does violence to the Constitution and makes justice truly blind.”108
Justice Douglas criticized the majority’s test as one that would lead 
to “ludicrous results [with] [t]he present case [being] an excellent ex-
ample.”109 This is because the “grossest and most dangerous act of 
treason may be, as in this case, and often is, innocent on its face.”110
The majority, Douglas continued, “confuses proof of the overt act 
with proof of the purpose or intent with which the overt act was 
committed and, without historical support, expands the constitution-
al requirement so as to include an element of proof not embraced by 
its words.”111
 Instead, Justice Douglas favored the standard set forth by the 
government and adopted by the Second Circuit, which he thought 
best represented the historical materials and past judicial prece-
dents.112 According to Justice Douglas, the alleged overt act need only 
“be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was part of 
the treasonable project and done in furtherance of it.”113 Because 
each of the overt acts submitted to the jury satisfied this standard, 
Justice Douglas and his three fellow dissenters would have affirmed 
the conviction.114
 Despite Justice Douglas’s stinging criticisms, Justice Jackson’s 
opinion received much praise from his colleagues.115 Either way, it 
                                                                                                                    
clearly provides aid and comfort to the enemy and thus, if proven by two witnesses, would 
most likely have been sufficient. Id. at 38-39.  
 107. Id. at 36 nn.45, 48. 
 108. Id. at 67 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 59. 
 110. Id. at 60. 
 111. Id. at 61. 
 112. See id. at 62. 
 113. Id. at 61. 
 114. See id. at 62. 
 115. Justice Roberts remarked that the Cramer opinion “will be recognized as one wor-
thy to rank with the best ever written by a Justice of the Court.” Handwritten Note from 
Owen Roberts, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, on Memorandum from Justice Jackson 
to Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (March 9, 1945) (Robert H. Jack-
son Papers, Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). Justice Frankfurter told 
Justice Jackson that “Cramer is an impressive performance. It is what an opinion by the 
Supreme Court of the US should be on such an issue . . . .” Handwritten Note from Felix 
Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, 
U.S. Supreme Court (undated) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 131, Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division). Justice Murphy called it a “splendid opinion.” Handwritten Note 
from Frank Murphy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Jus-
tice, U.S. Supreme Court (undated) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 131, Library of Con-
gress, Manuscript Division). Even Justice Reed, one of the dissenters, called it a “fine opi-
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was a landmark opinion because it represented the first time the 
United States Supreme Court had decided a case involving a treason 
conviction and the first time it had interpreted the overt act and giv-
ing aid and comfort to the enemy provisions of the Treason Clause.116
 Although the Court vacated Cramer’s conviction, the government 
did not let him go free.117 While treason charges could have been 
brought again, the two sides reached a plea agreement on a different 
charge. Cramer pled guilty to violating the Trading with the Enemy 
Act and was sentenced to six years in prison.118
III.   THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM REGARDING THE 
JUSTICES’ MOTIVATIONS IN CRAMER
 Before examining the two factors I believe best account for why 
the Court divided as it did, I will first discuss how scholars have pre-
viously explained the Justices’ votes in Cramer and explore the 
weaknesses of these views. 
A.   Prior Scholarship on the Justices’ Motivations in Cramer
 To say there is conventional wisdom regarding the Justices’ moti-
vations in Cramer is probably overstating the matter, as there are so 
few analyses of Cramer’s voting blocs and dueling opinions. Most 
commentators have presumed that the Justices were influenced pri-
marily, if not entirely, by their respective understandings of the term 
“overt act.” Accordingly, the term’s history and prior judicial  
construction take center stage in most studies of the Court’s decision 
in Cramer.
 For example, in his seminal work on the law of treason, Hurst ex-
amines the Court’s decision in Cramer in light of his own historical 
findings as to the meaning of overt act.119 This is not surprising given 
that Hurst was assigned to research such issues for this very case. 
Focusing almost exclusively on whether the majority’s decision was 
consistent with the historical underpinnings and previous judicial in-
terpretations of the overt act requirement, Hurst implicitly accepts 
that it was differing views as to history and precedent that led to the 
opposing conclusions of Justice Jackson and Justice Douglas.  
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 Based on these terms, Hurst believed that Justice Douglas got the 
better of the debate. According to Hurst, Justice Jackson’s reading of 
the history and precedent was misguided.120 For instance, with re-
spect to British treatises on treason, Justice Jackson’s opinion relied 
on the writings of Coke and Blackstone, while Justice Douglas’s dis-
sent relied on Foster.121 For Hurst, “Foster seem[s] to deserve by far 
the highest praise for depth and clarity of analysis,” whereas Coke 
and Blackstone are often “ambiguous,” “disorganized,” “short,” and 
generally contribute “nothing new in thought and little in penetra-
tion.”122 Similarly, Professor Hurst criticized the Court’s opinion in 
Cramer as going  
far beyond the current of previous American authority by appar-
ently insisting that the act of adherence to the enemy must  
be one which successfully confers tangible benefit upon the enemy; 
an act which is merely a step in furtherance of a design to confer 
such benefit is not enough, however substantially it may advance 
that purpose.123
 As for previous judicial constructions and prior legal precedent, 
Justice Jackson’s opinion once again draws the ire of Hurst: “The 
American decisions under the Constitution, with one exception, were 
in accord before the Cramer case.”124 That one exception was Judge 
Hand’s decision in Robinson, which Cramer heavily relied upon and 
to which Justice Jackson referred approvingly.125 According to Hurst, 
“[t]he majority opinion in Cramer v. United States advances no justi-
fication in history or authority for its apparent insistence that, to 
make out an overt act, ‘actual’ aid be given.”126 Hurst did not attempt 
to explain why the Justices, and Justice Jackson in particular, pre-
ferred the interpretations they espoused; instead, he simply accepted 
that it was opposing views of history and precedent that led to the 
different conclusions. 
 Like Hurst, nearly every subsequent commentator has narrowly 
focused on the Justices’ treatments of prior judicial precedents and 
other similar legal materials. For example, Professor David Currie 
recounts the historical and precedential debate between Justice 
Jackson and Justice Douglas but, unlike Hurst, sides with Justice 
Jackson’s reading of the relevant materials.127 Although Currie con-
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cedes that “Justice Douglas was right about the law of conspiracy, 
and most treason cases before Cramer had taken the same position,” 
he finds Judge Hand’s formulation more persuasive.128 For Currie, it 
appears that “Hand and Jackson may have had the better of this in-
teresting dispute.”129 Most importantly, Currie assumes that the divi-
sion of the Justices is properly understood as a “dispute” over the 
meaning of overt act in light of historical and precedential factors.130
 In his particularly thorough article about the Cramer case, Pro-
fessor J. Woodford Howard implicitly presumes that the historical 
and precedential materials, in addition to advocacy by the respective 
lawyers, were largely responsible for the case’s outcome and opi-
nions.131 For instance, Howard notes that Justice Jackson was influ-
enced, at least in part, by Judge Hand’s dicta in Robinson.132 On the 
other side, Justice Douglas, relying on Hurst’s history, “castigated 
the Court for distorting history, facts, and the Constitution.”133
 Scholars writing closer to the announcement of the Cramer opi-
nion also focused on the surface issue of the definition of an overt act. 
For example, Professor Edward Corwin explained the divided Court 
as split according to differing views on history and precedent.134 Pro-
fessor Corwin refers to Judge Hand’s opinion in Robinson, along with 
Lord Reading’s comments upon which Judge Hand relied, as what 
“has now become the law of the Court [in Cramer].”135 Like Hurst, 
Corwin believed Justice Douglas’s opinion espoused “the view which 
has most [of] history [in] back of it, and which our courts have gener-
ally followed heretofore.”136 As for Justice Jackson’s opinion, by con-
trast, Corwin sharply critiqued his interpretation of the relevant his-
torical materials: 
Most of Justice Jackson’s learning seems to have been drawn from 
an elaborate study undertaken at the instance of the Solicitor 
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General . . . . While parading much of this learning in lengthy 
footnotes, the Justice finally concludes: ‘Historical materials 
are . . . of little help’—which is quite true so far as his opinion  
is concerned.137
 A possible, albeit narrow, exception to this frame of thought is the 
explanation offered by Professor William Wiecek. In his recent work, 
Wiecek calls Justice Jackson’s opinion in Cramer “law-office history 
driven by policy goals that Jackson sought to impose.”138 According to 
Wiecek, such policy goals included an “expansively libertarian” pro-
tection of free speech.139 “[L]iberal in a speech-protective sense,” 
Jackson’s opinion in Cramer “severely disabl[ed] the power of gov-
ernment to convert political opposition into the ultimate crime.”140
But even Wiecek notes that “[t]he long-term speech-protective value 
of Cramer lay in Jackson’s concoction of history.”141 Notably, Wiecek 
does not attempt to explain why the other eight Justices decided 
Cramer as they did; instead, his analysis focuses almost exclusively 
on Justice Jackson. 
 The view that the Justices were primarily influenced by the his-
torical and precedential materials relating to the meaning of an overt 
act certainly makes much intuitive sense. Indeed, the meaning of the 
overt act requirement was the precise question the Court had asked 
the parties to address during reargument,142 and history and 
precedent are the sorts of materials to which jurists typically turn 
when making legal decisions. As will be discussed below, however, 
these explanations cannot fully account for why the Justices voted, 
and divided, as they did. 
B.   The Weaknesses of the Conventional Wisdom 
 Despite the facial appeal of the explanation described in the pre-
vious section, it would be wrong to assume that Justice Jackson’s 
opinion was guided only by a distinct understanding of the meaning 
of an overt act based on history and prior judicial construction. This 
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is because his interpretation of the overt act requirement, but not the 
result of the case, changed on multiple occasions as he drafted the 
majority opinion. Thus, one can fairly infer that Jackson’s opinion 
was not motivated solely by a particular understanding of the overt 
act requirement; rather, it was a result-oriented opinion where his 
proposed standard varied from draft to draft.143
 During the summer of 1944, months before the second set of oral 
arguments were to be held, Justice Jackson drafted an opinion that 
addressed the constitutional issues in Cramer.144 In this opinion, 
Jackson emphasized the government’s failure to meet its burden of 
proof, but he did not provide any sort of detailed explanation of the 
overt act requirement.145 Instead, Jackson explained that the gov-
ernment’s own erroneous interpretation of the overt act requirement 
was grounds enough for dismissing the indictment: 
 The Government relies upon the analogy to conspiracy prosecu-
tions in which it points out it is permitted to establish as the overt 
act, without which prosecution is not authorized, any act, however 
innocent, in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is enough to observe 
that the Constitution says nothing about conspiracy and that the 
freedom which is left to Congress in dealing with conspiracy was 
expressly taken away in the case of treason. If that were not 
enough we might observe that nothing that goes on in the courts is 
more menacing to the rights of individuals than the way in which 
persons are being tried for conspiracies instead of for substantive 
offenses so that the stupid acts of a few may impart guilt by asso-
ciation to those whose actual guilt is more doubtful. We are power-
less—perhaps—to deal with this tendency, but that does not 
excuse us for refusing to face it where the constitutional mandate 
is plain. I therefore conclude that the Government has failed to 
make its case within the limitations of the Constitution and that 
the indictment should be dismissed.146
 Come December 1944, after the votes in conference had taken 
place, Justice Jackson revisited the opinion he was now formally as-
signed to write for the Court and significantly changed his ap-
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proach.147 In this draft, Justice Jackson noted the respective interpre-
tations set forth by the parties: the government’s argument that the 
overt act requirement for treason was akin to conspiracy law and 
Cramer’s claim that the overt act must openly manifest treason, in-
cluding a treasonable purpose.148 After laying out these two options, 
Justice Jackson observed that a decision in favor of either interpreta-
tion “has serious practical consequences” and warned that “[i]f the 
Government’s contention be sustained, the requirement of two wit-
nesses will have little practical significance as a protection against 
treason accusations.”149 Jackson also pointed out, however, that if the 
“defendant’s contention be sound,” then the “requirements of proof 
are so exacting that convictions of treason must be exceedingly 
rare.”150 As a result, Jackson proclaimed that “[n]o middle ground 
appears tenable.”151
 In this draft, Justice Jackson sided with the interpretation he 
thought to be the best (or, perhaps, least worst) of the two unsatisfac-
tory standards: the interpretation put forth by Cramer and Judge 
Hand. According to Jackson, “the Government in every treason pros-
ecution must bear the burden of showing by the testimony of two 
witnesses some overt act which reasonably tends to show a treasona-
ble purpose.”152 Jackson also made clear that both adherence to the 
enemy and aid and comfort must be proven by an overt act testified 
to by two witnesses; if an overt act “manifests only a single  
element, . . . the other [element] also is required to be proved by  
an overt act.”153 Because at least two of the overt acts alleged against 
Cramer did not “indicate even remotely adherence to the enemies  
of the United States, and it is highly doubtful if it indicates aid  
and comfort to them,” Jackson proclaimed that the conviction must 
be reversed.154
 In response to this most recent draft, Jackson’s law clerk, Phil 
Neal, wrote the Justice a memorandum critiquing the draft opinion, 
specifically its “reasonable-manifestation-of-intention” test.155 Neal 
began the memo with the following disclaimer: “At this stage of your 
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draft it may . . . be of some help if I take a position considerably dif-
ferent—possibly too radical to be useful in itself but at the same time 
something to sharpen your own weapon on. I ought to add before 
going further that my analysis, such as it is, doesn’t lead me to the 
wrong conclusion, so it isn’t essentially argumentative.”156
 Neal’s objection to the test adopted in Justice Jackson’s latest 
draft opinion was not that he thought it was wrong, but rather that 
“the suggested test leaves me highly uneasy as to its applicability to 
cases other than the present one and as to whether its logical defi-
ciencies and loopholes are not quite serious.”157 Neal argued that by 
requiring the overt act to demonstrate treasonable intent, the draft 
opinion improperly placed the entire burden of treason on “acts,
when the crucial significance of many kinds of (what ought to be) 
treasonable conduct may well lie in non-acts.”158 Instead, Neal pro-
posed, all that should have to be proven by two witnesses (i.e., by the 
overt act) is “that the defendant gave aid and comfort to the enemy”; 
“the intent [may] be proved by whatever evidence is ordinarily ad-
missible on such issues.”159 Neal concluded by noting that his pro-
posed test would leave the Court “[e]xactly where the manifest-intent 
test does, for the evidence as to the meetings with Thiel by no means 
proves that aid and comfort were given to the enemy. In fact, it seems 
to me far less conclusive on that score than on the score of intent.”160
 Within three days time, Justice Jackson had incorporated Neal’s 
suggestions and, once again, changed his mode of attack on Cramer’s 
conviction.161 In this latest draft opinion, Justice Jackson criticized 
the standard offered by Cramer—the very test he had adopted in his 
earlier draft opinion: “the manifest-intention test of overt acts is a 
terminology that so far as the work of the trial judge is concerned 
leads only to a cul-de-sac.”162 Justice Jackson, having now found a 
tenable middle ground thanks to Neal’s memorandum, stated, “We 
do not think the plain meaning of the Constitution permits us to ac-
cept the theory of the Government, and we do not think the facts of 
this case require us to go so far as to adopt the manifest-intention 
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doctrine of the prisoner.”163 Instead, Justice Jackson adopted a stan-
dard that would closely resemble that found in the final Cramer opi-
nion: “The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in 
a treason prosecution is that it make a prima facie showing that the 
defendant actually extended aid and comfort to the enemy.”164
 Justice Jackson’s various drafts indicate that he was not moti-
vated solely by a particular understanding of judicial precedent with 
respect to the overt act requirement. The same can also be said for 
the other members of the Cramer majority. When the other Justices 
in the majority initially voted in conference to reverse the conviction, 
they were presumably relying on the interpretation of the overt act 
requirement offered by Cramer’s defense. Each of these Justices, 
however, fully joined Justice Jackson’s final opinion—an opinion that 
employed a standard that had not been asserted by any party at any 
point during the litigation.165 Thus, it seems unlikely that the Justic-
es were motivated solely by judicial precedent or other similar histor-
ical materials about the meaning of overt act. 
 Given the unsettled nature of what the overt act requirement en-
tailed, the Justices had to look elsewhere. As even Justice Jackson 
would admit in one of his draft opinions, “[t]he judicial history of 
treason gives us little help; few of the cases presented even inciden-
tally [address] the question we have here, and conflicting decisions 
have resulted in those which did. The slate on which we write today 
is relatively a clean one.”166
IV.   REASSESSING THE JUSTICES’ MOTIVATIONS IN CRAMER
 Perhaps because the slate was a relatively clean one, the Justices 
had to rely on factors other than prior judicial construction when 
making a decision in Cramer. As explained below, these factors were 
still legal in nature but addressed broader concerns than the more 
technical question at hand. Specifically, the Justices were largely in-
fluenced by their attitudes on two broader issues. The first was the 
degree to which Congress may circumvent the Treason Clause by 
criminalizing similar conduct under a heading other than treason 
(such as espionage, sedition, sabotage, or the like) and without the 
procedural protections required by the Treason Clause. The second 
was the degree to which the Framers intended to make treason quite 
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difficult to prosecute. Determining where each Justice fell on these 
two questions best accounts for the specific breakdown in Cramer.
A.   Congressional Circumvention and the Treason Clause 
 The first issue I will consider is the degree to which the Justices 
believed that Congress could circumvent the Treason Clause by pro-
scribing conduct similar, if not identical, to treason under a different 
heading and without treason’s procedural safeguards. Justices who 
thought Congress’s ability to create substitute crimes was limited by 
the Constitution were more likely to favor an interpretation of the 
overt act requirement that gave Congress and the Executive suffi-
cient leeway to punish treasonous conduct. If treason were made too 
difficult to prove and Congress could not provide viable alternatives, 
reasoned these Justices, then many potential traitors would be able 
escape criminal punishment entirely. Thus, these Justices preferred 
a relatively low burden of proof for treason prosecutions, since Con-
gress would be otherwise limited in proscribing the conduct at issue. 
 On the other hand, Justices that fell on the other side of this ques-
tion—that is, those who did not find it problematic for Congress to 
enact substitute crimes—preferred a more exacting interpretation of 
the overt act requirement. Other options, reasoned these Justices, 
would be available to Congress to punish those individuals the gov-
ernment could not prosecute for treason because of the procedural 
requirements. Moreover, these Justices preferred the more specific 
charges typically provided by Congress rather than the relatively va-
gue prohibition provided by the Treason Clause.  
 In the case of Cramer, the votes of most of the Justices, including 
Chief Justice Stone, and Justices Black, Douglas, Jackson, and 
Frankfurter, can be better understood by exploring their views on 
this question. 
1.   Chief Justice Stone 
 Chief Justice Stone’s decision to affirm Cramer’s treason convic-
tion presents one of the clearest examples of a Justice being influ-
enced by his beliefs on this topic. As noted earlier, Chief Justice 
Stone pushed the Court to reach the constitutional issues presented 
in the case.167 In his memorandum to the conference advocating such 
a move, the Chief Justice also expressed his concerns about adopting 
Cramer’s more exacting interpretation of the overt act requirement 
(that the overt act must “manifest a treasonable purpose”): 
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 There are some difficulties with respect to this aspect of the case 
which I think should be brought to your attention. One, resulting 
from the adoption of [Cramer’s] test of the overt act, is the extreme 
difficulty in its application and in cases of giving aid and comfort 
to the enemy, especially in this country, there would be almost no 
overt acts which, apart from explanation afforded by other evi-
dence, would themselves indicate the treasonable purpose. 
 The effect of such an interpretation would be, I believe, to emas-
culate the treason provision in practically all cases save those of 
levying war where in some but not all instances the war-like act 
would itself evidence the treasonable purpose. In the present case I 
do not see how it would be possible to convict Cramer because none 
of the overt acts charged seem to me to manifest of themselves the 
treasonable purpose. 
 There is still a further difficulty. If the acts actually committed 
are treason but the overt acts cannot be proven as required by the 
Constitution because they do not of themselves manifest the trea-
sonable purpose, could Congress enact a statute which could dis-
pense with the requirement for proof of an overt act which could 
constitutionally punish the treasonable acts? Punishment is for-
bidden by the Constitution unless the offense is proved in the man-
ner provided by the Constitution. That would seem to exclude the 
possibility of Congress’s providing by legislation for the punishment 
of the acts constituting treason as defined by the Constitution with-
out satisfying the constitutional requirement as to proof of overt 
acts. That was a difficulty lurking in the background of the Sabo-
teur cases which I managed to avoid under the peculiar circums-
tances of that case. 
 If the suggested test of the overt act is adopted I should think 
that a traitor could not be convicted of treason in a case like Cra-
mer’s and that there would be difficulty in drawing a statute under 
which he could be punished for his treasonable acts under any oth-
er label.168
 In a later memorandum, Chief Justice Stone once again expressed 
his concern over adopting a standard more exacting than the one 
suggested by the government:  
 The question whether the phrase ‘overt act’ means anything 
more than the words imply, i.e., any act done in pursuance of a 
treasonable design . . . is an important one. Upon the answer de-
pends the answer to the question whether the treason provision of 
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the Constitution can have any practical efficacy except in the sin-
gle case of openly bearing arms against our armed forces.169
 As can be seen from these internal Court documents, Stone be-
lieved that Congress was limited in its ability to punish treasonous 
conduct under a separate heading. In addition, he was fearful of rais-
ing the bar so high that neither a treason prosecution nor Congress 
through a separate statute could surmount it. Not surprisingly, Chief 
Justice Stone joined Justice Douglas’s dissent, which adopted a mar-
kedly more lenient interpretation of the overt act requirement—that 
the overt act need only be proven to be a “part of the treasonable 
project and done in furtherance of it.”170
2.   Justice Black 
 Unlike the clear articulation of Chief Justice Stone’s position, the 
views of fellow dissenter Justice Black on this topic require some de-
gree of speculation based on his actions in a later case. In the prose-
cution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for disclosing atomic secrets to 
the Soviet Union, the government charged the Rosenbergs with con-
spiracy to violate the Espionage Act, not for committing treason.171
The Rosenbergs were convicted at trial, and their convictions were 
affirmed by the Second Circuit. On petition for rehearing before the 
Second Circuit, the Rosenbergs argued that their convictions under 
the conspiracy and espionage statutes were unconstitutional because 
they were essentially being prosecuted for committing treason with-
out the procedural safeguards required under the Treason Clause.172
The Second Circuit rejected this argument and once again affirmed 
the convictions.173
 The Rosenbergs made the same claim, along with others, when 
petitioning the Supreme Court. The Court repeatedly rejected the 
Rosenbergs’ petitions for certiorari and rehearing over the dissent of 
Justice Black, who believed that certiorari should be granted.174 Dis-
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senting from the Court’s decision to vacate a stay of execution, Jus-
tice Black explained why he consistently voted to grant certiorari:  
I voted to grant certiorari originally in this case. That petition for 
certiorari challenged the fairness of the trial. It also challenged the 
right of the Government to try these defendants except under the 
limited rules prescribed by the Constitution defining the offense of 
treason. These I then believed to be important questions.175
The personal notes of Justice Frankfurter confirm Justice Black’s ex-
planation. Detailing the Court’s first conference about the Rosenberg 
case, Justice Frankfurter stated: 
Black voted to grant. He thought the fact that a death sentence 
had been imposed in time of peace for what was in effect a charge 
of treason, though formally a prosecution under the Espionage Act, 
without observance of the constitutional requirement (Art. III, Sec. 
3), presented a serious question.176
 Based on his actions in Rosenberg, Justice Black appears to have 
shared the same concerns as Chief Justice Stone about congressional 
circumvention of the Treason Clause. Whether he held that concern 
in 1945 requires some speculation; however, presuming he did,  
it would certainly help explain Justice Black’s vote to affirm Cra-
mer’s conviction.  
 This is especially true given his qualms about making treason 
prosecutions too difficult. During the Cramer deliberations, Black 
agreed with Stone that if a conviction for treason was not “sustained 
on evidence such as the government produced here, I doubt if there 
could be many convictions for treason unless American citizens were 
actually found in the Army of the enemy.”177
3.   Justice Douglas 
 Like Justice Black, divining Justice Douglas’s position on this is-
sue requires some inference from a subsequent opinion. In Dennis v. 
United States, the Court affirmed a conviction under the Smith Act, 
which prohibited individuals from advocating the overthrow of the 
government by force or violence and encompassed those who “ ‘be-
come a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or as-
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sembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.’ ”178 Justice Doug-
las, who dissented, was troubled in part by the lack of an overt act 
requirement under the Smith Act. Comparing a prosecution under 
the Smith Act to a prosecution for constructive treason, Justice 
Douglas pointed out that “[t]reason was defined to require overt 
acts—the evolution of a plot against the country into an actual 
project. The present case is not one of treason. But the analogy is 
close when the illegality is made to turn on intent, not on the nature 
of the act.”179 Whether Justice Douglas’s concern about the lack of an 
overt act requirement in the Smith Act translates to a concern about 
Congress proscribing treasonous conduct under a different heading 
and without the procedural safeguards of the Treason Clause again 
requires some speculation. Assuming that Justice Douglas did have 
such a concern, and assuming that he had that same concern in 
1945, it is not surprising that he, like Chief Justice Stone and Justice 
Black, voted in favor of a more lenient standard in Cramer.
4.   Justice Jackson 
 On the other side of this question sit Justices Jackson and Frank-
furter. Justice Jackson’s view on this matter is clear from his opinion 
for the Court, in which he attempted to quell any fear that a more 
exacting interpretation of the overt act requirement would hamstring 
the government’s ability to protect itself: 
The Government has urged that our initial interpretation of the 
treason clause should be less exacting, lest treason be too hard to 
prove and the Government disabled from adequately combating 
the techniques of modern warfare. But the treason offense is not 
the only nor can it well serve as the principal legal weapon to vin-
dicate our national cohesion and security.180
Justice Jackson then cited a variety of federal statutes that punished 
conduct harmful to national security, including the Espionage Act, 
Sedition Act, and Trading with the Enemy Act.181 Not wanting to 
eviscerate the Treason Clause entirely, Justice Jackson tried to make 
clear that “[o]f course we do not intimate that Congress could dis-
pense with the two-witness rule merely by giving the same offense 
another name.”182 In virtually the same breath, however, Justice 
Jackson reiterated that “the power of Congress is in no way limited 
                                                                                                                    
 178. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 496 (1951) (quoting The Smith Act, 54 
Stat. 671). 
 179. Id. at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 180. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945). 
 181. See id. at 45 n.53. 
 182. Id. at 45. 
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to enact prohibitions of specified acts thought detrimental to our 
wartime safety.”183
 Thus, Justice Jackson had no qualms about interpreting the Trea-
son Clause in a manner that might put an end to treason prosecu-
tions since Congress enjoyed much leeway in punishing the same or 
similar conduct through other means. As a result, it is not surprising 
that Justice Jackson voted to reverse the conviction of Cramer and 
supported a more exacting standard for the overt act requirement. 
5.   Justice Frankfurter 
 Justice Frankfurter’s view on this issue is also relatively clear. In 
response to Chief Justice Stone’s aforementioned memorandum, Jus-
tice Frankfurter shared his own thoughts on the subject with the 
members of the Court. According to Justice Frankfurter, it was per-
missible for the Court to make it “extremely difficult to prove trea-
son” because  
Congress is not circumscribed by the provision regarding treason 
to outlaw incriminating acts that are, as it were, on the way. Con-
gress could particularize or generalize all sorts of dealings with 
known enemy aliens and invoke reasonable presumptions that 
would be well within our opinion in the Tot case. The treason con-
cerning which the Constitution provided was a well-known historic 
concept, and the procedural requirements for its proof do not ex-
tend to proscribed conduct other than treason.184
Thus, like Justice Jackson, Justice Frankfurter was not troubled by a 
more exacting interpretation of the overt act requirement because he 
believed that Congress could essentially circumvent such limitations 
by adopting statutes that criminalized the same conduct under a dif-
ferent heading. Consequently, it is not surprising that Justice Frank-
furter joined Justice Jackson’s opinion and voted to reverse Cramer’s 
treason conviction.185
                                                                                                                    
 183. Id.
 184. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harlan F. 
Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 24, 1944) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Box 
131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). The Tot case to which Justice Frankfurter 
referred is Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). That case (which involved the inter-
pretation of section 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act) held, inter alia, that “a statutory pre-
sumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved 
and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbi-
trary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.” Id. at 467-68. 
 185. Likewise, it is fair to infer that the other members of the Cramer majority—
Justices Roberts, Rutledge, and Murphy—likely held views similar to those of Justices 
Jackson and Frankfurter on the matter, given that they all joined Justice Jackson’s major-
ity opinion, including the passage making clear that Congress enjoyed great leeway when 
it came to enacting substitute crimes. 
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B.   The Purpose of the Treason Clause and the Frequency of Trea-
son Prosecutions 
 The second issue I will consider is the degree to which the Justices 
believed that the purpose of the Treason Clause was to make treason 
prosecutions very difficult and, as a result, relatively rare. According 
to Justice Jackson, the answer to this question would likely deter-
mine each Justice’s views as to the definition of an overt act. In one 
of his draft opinions, Justice Jackson posited that “[u]ltimately I sus-
pect however rationalized any choice between the two interpretations 
[of overt act, as offered by the government and Cramer,] will rest on 
one’s attitude toward treason prosecutions, rather than on any light 
he gets from the wording or history of the constitutional provision.”186
In effect, a Justice will likely be more motivated by his feelings about 
the propriety of treason prosecutions generally than any specific be-
liefs as to the meaning of the overt act requirement specifically. 
 If the Justice believed that the purpose of the Treason Clause was 
to make treason prosecutions exceedingly rare, he would have likely 
preferred a more exacting interpretation of the overt act require-
ment. Conversely, if the Justice thought treason should remain a vi-
able charging option, he would have likely supported a more lenient 
standard. The Cramer dissenters, by virtue of joining Justice Doug-
las’s opinion adopting the government’s conspiracy-like standard, 
clearly were not troubled at the thought of permitting treason prose-
cutions to continue. On the other hand, Justices Frankfurter, Mur-
phy, and Rutledge all expressed (as discussed in more detail below) a 
preference for disallowing treason prosecutions in all but the rarest 
of circumstances. Not coincidentally, all three voted to reverse the 
treason conviction in Cramer.
1.   Justice Frankfurter 
 In the same memorandum in which he responded to Chief Justice 
Stone’s qualms about congressional circumvention, Justice Frankfur-
ter also made it clear that he believed the Treason Clause was 
adopted precisely to make treason prosecutions difficult and there-
fore rare:
Wise old Ben Franklin convinced the Constitution makers that 
‘prosecutions for treason were generally virulent; and perjury too 
easily made use of against innocence.’ In other words, war disturbs 
minds so that even honest people fall easy victims to self-delusion 
or rumor and will swear to things that never happened. War also 
is fine pickins [sic] for professional informers and generally men of 
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low character. And so the Constitution decided that it is not 
enough to prove treasonable agreements, you must also prove ‘an 
overt act’ and, what is more you must prove it by two witnesses. It 
would deny everything that we know about Franklin to assume 
that an ample remedy to avoid the evils against which he was 
guarding was to prove a wholly innocent act against an accused so 
long as you have perjurious testimony to prove the concoction of a 
treasonable scheme when mountain-high proof of such a scheme in 
itself was not to be trusted. 
 A contrary view no doubt makes it extremely difficult to prove 
treason, but that is precisely what Franklin meant to accomplish 
and what he persuaded the Constitution makers to enjoin. I myself 
am not troubled by the fear that ‘A traitor could not be convicted of 
treason in a case like Cramer.’ In the first place that assumes that 
in a case like Cramer he is a traitor, and in the second place it dis-
regards the readiness of the Constitution to let some traitors es-
cape in order to make it more difficult to manufacture evidence 
against people who are not traitors.187
 Thus, when forced to choose between two disparate interpreta-
tions of the overt act requirement, each with some history and judi-
cial precedent on its side, it is not surprising that Justice Frankfur-
ter would prefer the understanding that made treason prosecutions 
more difficult to pursue. This is especially true given that when Jus-
tice Frankfurter voted in conference, he was essentially choosing be-
tween the extreme positions offered by the government and Cramer. 
Justice Jackson had not yet drafted his middle of the road approach 
to the overt act requirement that would later serve as the opinion of 
the Court. Thus, Justice Frankfurter would have likely supported an 
even more exacting standard than was eventually adopted by the fi-
nal Cramer opinion. 
2.   Justice Murphy 
 Justice Murphy was unparalleled in his devotion to the “civil li-
berties” position during the war.188 In a revealing letter to Justice 
Jackson, Justice Murphy made the following request regarding the 
Cramer decision: 
                                                                                                                    
 187. Frankfurter, supra note 184. 
 188. PRITCHETT, supra note 143, at 259 (“The outstanding fact about Murphy, then, is 
the precedence which he grants to claims for individual rights and freedom from govern-
mental infringement on personal liberties. He votes to strike down all limitations on free 
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 I hope you will anchor your views [in Cramer] on the view that 
in all our list of crimes treason is the capitol of them all and the 
reasons for this view. 
Thus it would be helpful to explain why the Fathers wanted to 
make it almost impossible to commit treason—you know how our 
nation was founded—you also know that it hung by a thread for 
years and had the great adventure collapsed many a hero would 
have been a traitor . . . . 
 There is something that was not mentioned in conference—that 
is the careless view emotional people adopt in judging their neigh-
bors in all countries at war . . . .  
 . . . .  
 [W]e may easily imagine the . . . abuse and excessive conduct on 
the part of mob-rule in our country if for instance depression fol-
lows the war. All of it suggests great care and caution and re-
straint in writing it out for the court.189
 Justice Murphy’s dissenting opinion in Haupt v. United States,190
a treason case decided by the Court two years after Cramer, also 
demonstrated his belief that treason should be exceptionally hard to 
prove and therefore equally rare. In Haupt, the Court voted 8-1 in 
favor of affirming the treason conviction of Hans Max Haupt, a fa-
ther of one of the Nazi saboteurs.191 Haupt was charged and convicted 
for assisting his son in the purchase of an automobile and helping 
him seek reemployment by a lens plant where the son was supposed 
to gather valuable information about the plant’s inner workings.192
 Again speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson applied the stan-
dard developed in Cramer and found that unlike in Cramer, the overt 
acts submitted to the jury against Haupt were constitutionally suffi-
cient because they “unmistakabl[y]” demonstrated that Haupt gave 
aid and comfort to his saboteur son.193
                                                                                                                    
 189. Handwritten Note from Frank Murphy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to 
Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (undated) (Robert H. Jackson Pa-
pers, Box 131, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division) (emphasis added). 
 190. 330 U.S. 631 (1947). 
 191. Id. at 633. 
 192. Id. at 632-33; see also HURST, supra note 8, at 236-37. 
 193. See Haupt, 330 U.S. at 634-35. The three overt acts submitted to the jury in 
Haupt were the sheltering of his son, helping him purchase an automobile, and assisting 
him seek reemployment at a lens plant. Id. at 634. According to Justice Jackson: 
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Id. at 635. Jackson, in typical linguistic flair, also rejected Haupt’s claim that he was only 
acting as a father helping his son:  
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 Justice Murphy, the lone dissenter, proposed a much more exact-
ing standard than that espoused by the Court:  
To rise to the status of an overt act of treason, an act of assistance 
must be utterly incompatible with any of the foregoing sources  
of action. It must be an act which is consistent only with  
a treasonable intention and with the accomplishment of the trea-
sonable plan, giving due consideration to all the relevant sur-
rounding circumstances.194
 An earlier draft of Murphy’s dissent contains an unpublished sec-
tion that provides further insight into his attitudes about treason 
and treason prosecutions:  
By limiting treason to those acts which are completely inconsistent 
with non-treasonous motives, we are removing the crime from the 
realm of war-hysteria. For often an act is labeled an overt act of 
treason only because it occurs in a treasonous atmosphere or be-
cause it [is] some sort of non-treasonous aid or comfort to one who 
adheres to the enemy’s cause. The passions naturally inflamed by 
war greatly increase the possibility [of] use of this careless concept 
of an overt act of treason. It is to guard against that possibility 
that we must erect appropriate standards.195
In light of these statements, Justice Murphy clearly believed that 
Treason should be difficult to prosecute and, accordingly, voted to re-
verse the conviction in Cramer.
3.   Justice Rutledge 
 Justice Rutledge’s views require some speculation, but not much 
imagination. Justice Rutledge frequently voted with Justice Murphy, 
                                                                                                                    
It is argued that Haupt merely had the misfortune to sire a traitor and all he 
did was to act as an indulgent father toward a disloyal son. In view however of 
the evidence . . . , the jury apparently concluded that the son had the misfor-
tune of being a chip off the old block—a tree inclined as the twig had been 
bent . . . . 
Id. at 641-42. 
 194. Id. at 647 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Murphy also provided ex-
amples of what should constitute an overt act under his preferred standard:  
Thus an act supplying a military map to a saboteur for use in the execution of 
his nefarious plot is an overt act of treason since it excludes all possibility of 
having been motivated by non-treasonable considerations. But an act of provid-
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having a non-treasonable basis even when performed in a treasonable setting; 
accordingly, it cannot qualify as an overt act of treason.  
Id.
 195. Handwritten Notes on Justice Murphy’s Draft Dissent for No. 49 Haupt v. United 
States (April 24, 1944) (Frank Murphy Papers, Roll 136, on microfilm at Michigan Histori-
cal Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan). 
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and the two typically shared the same outlooks when it came to crim-
inal defendants or civil liberties during the war.196 Before Cramer
was handed down, Justice Rutledge sent Justice Jackson a detailed 
letter in response to a draft opinion that Jackson had circulated. In 
this letter, Rutledge pushed for Jackson to bolster the overt act stan-
dard and wanted the opinion of the Court to also require the overt 
act to “show knowledge or intent that [is] helpful to the enemy,” not 
merely that the act involved actual aid and comfort.197 This standard 
would have undoubtedly made treason prosecutions more difficult. 
Cognizant, however, that Justice Jackson had “the job of getting and 
keeping five together and any single change might prevent adherence 
of one or more,” Justice Rutledge said he would not press the issue.198
 Further evidence of Justice Rutledge’s attitude toward treason 
prosecutions can be gleaned from his actions in the Haupt case. 
There, Justice Rutledge initially voted, as did Justices Murphy and 
Reed, to reverse the conviction of Haupt.199 In a case memorandum 
written when Justice Rutledge was still in favor of reversing the con-
viction, Justice Rutledge (or, more likely, his law clerk) observed that 
“it is difficult for me to see in these overt acts [alleged against Haupt] 
any more substance than in those charged in the Cramer case.”200
The case memorandum finished by stating that “I should reverse the 
conviction probably on the ground that the overt acts were not 
proved by direct testimony and perhaps also on the ground that the 
overt acts charged, or some of them, were not legally sufficient.”201 In 
a separate memo written by Justice Rutledge’s law clerk, though 
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672 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:635 
probably at the request of Justice Rutledge, the clerk refers to Jus-
tice Jackson’s proposed Haupt opinion as “rather cavalier treatment, 
especially considering that the case is treason. . . . I am in some 
doubt as to the outcome, but this being treason I resolve them in fa-
vor of reversal.”202
 It is unclear when Justice Rutledge changed his mind and decided 
to vote with the majority and affirm Haupt’s conviction. In a  
note written to Justice Jackson two weeks before the opinion in 
Haupt was announced, Justice Rutledge asked for some additional 
time to decide:  
As to No. 49, Haupt, I had expected to be ready today to join either 
you or Murphy. My inclination is your way. But if it is not a matter 
of compelling necessity to get the case down Monday, I would like 
to have further time to consider before landing finally.203
This note is quite remarkable since the opinions written by Justice 
Jackson and Justice Murphy in Haupt offered vastly different view-
points regarding the definition of an overt act and the appropriate 
degree of difficulty for treason prosecutions. How Justice Rutledge 
was torn between these two views on the eve of publication is hard to 
understand; however, it almost certainly could not be based solely on 
his peculiar understanding of the overt act requirement (since the 
two opinions offered such radically different views on that matter). 
Justice Rutledge eventually decided to “acquiesce” and join Justice 
Jackson’s majority opinion.204 Perhaps he changed his mind because 
of an altered view as to the issues before the Court, or perhaps, as he 
had done before, “he was willing to compromise his own views in or-
der to obtain half a loaf.”205 But in Cramer, Justice Rutledge re-
mained steadfast in his vote to reverse the treason conviction and 
adopt the more exacting interpretation of the Treason Clause.206
C.   Implications and Consequences 
 The foregoing discussion does not fully account for each Justice’s 
vote, nor does it attempt to do so. The Justices’ views on these two 
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questions, however, demonstrate that the division in Cramer entailed 
more than simple differences over prior judicial precedents and other 
historical materials. Rather, these two broader issues provide as 
much, if not more, of an explanation when it comes to understanding 
why the Court decided Cramer as it did. 
 Understanding exactly what motivated the Justices in Cramer is 
important for several reasons. First, it provides insight about the 
sorts of items judges look to when traditional legal materials, such as 
prior judicial precedent, do not yield a convincing answer on the nar-
row issue at hand. Second, a proper understanding of what moti-
vated the Justices in Cramer sheds light on the issues they believed 
were at stake when deciding the case. Indeed, by tracing the various 
judicial fault lines, we can better appreciate what issues the Justices 
understood themselves to be deciding. 
 Based on the internal court documents discussed above, it is clear 
that the issue of congressional circumvention of the Treason Clause 
was on the table during deliberations. Notably, this issue was of ut-
most importance to the two Justices who pushed hardest for the 
Court to reach the constitutional issues in Cramer: Chief Justice 
Stone and Justice Jackson. 
 As noted earlier, Chief Justice Stone urged the Court to consider 
the constitutional issues, even over the objections of several of his 
colleagues.207 In doing so, he explained his fears that an exacting in-
terpretation of the overt act requirement would “emasculate the 
treason provision [of the Constitution] in practically all cases save 
those of levying war.”208 This would be particularly problematic given 
that the Constitution, according to Stone, prohibited Congress from 
“providing by legislation for the punishment of the acts constituting 
treason . . . without satisfying the constitutional requirement as  
to proof of overt acts.”209 Indeed, this concern was apparently so im-
portant to Stone that it caused him to be the only Justice who 
changed his vote after reargument of the constitutional issue (switch-
ing from reversing on evidentiary grounds to affirming on constitu-
tional grounds).210
 Stone’s primary ally in convincing the Court to reach the constitu-
tional issues was Justice Jackson. As noted above, Jackson also ex-
pressed a strong desire that the Court decide the substantive consti-
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tutional issues. In fact, Jackson went so far as to include a passage in 
an opinion he circulated prior to the request for reargument that in-
dicated that some of the Justices wished the Court would reach the 
constitutional issues.211
 Despite sharing this common goal, Chief Justice Stone and Jack-
son sharply diverged on the merits of the constitutional issues, in-
cluding the meaning of the overt act requirement and the degree to 
which Congress could circumvent the Treason Clause by proscribing 
the same conduct through other means. Chief Justice Stone persis-
tently argued for a more lenient interpretation of the overt act re-
quirement and believed that the Constitution imposed some limits on 
how Congress could criminalize treasonous behavior. Conversely, 
Justice Jackson adopted a more exacting standard for the overt act 
requirement and believed that Congress enjoyed wide latitude in its 
ability to prohibit conduct that threatened national security. 
 This underlying dispute is particularly noteworthy given that the 
vote in Cramer was so closely divided. If the Court had been 5-4 in 
favor of affirmance rather than reversal, it is quite likely that Chief 
Justice Stone’s views of the Treason Clause would have become con-
stitutional law. If he were in the majority, Chief Justice Stone would 
have had the ability to assign the opinion of the Court to whomever 
he pleased, including himself. Given how important the constitution-
al issues in Cramer apparently were to Chief Justice Stone, it is fair 
to assume that he likely would have assigned the opinion to himself. 
Of course, it is possible that he would have assigned the opinion to 
Justice Douglas (who ended up writing the dissent in Cramer) or 
Justice Black (the Justice who was originally assigned the opinion 
when the Court was only going to address the evidentiary issues). 
Because of the significant constitutional issues at stake, however, it 
is likely that Chief Justice Stone would have been the author of an 
opinion affirming Cramer’s treason conviction, given his clear and 
passionate articulation of what he believed to be the appropriate con-
stitutional standard in the various letters to his colleagues. This 
means that not only was the interpretation of the overt act require-
ment up for grabs, but the issue of congressional circumvention was 
as well. In other words, the Court was likely one vote away from 
adopting a very different view on both the meaning of an overt act 
and the degree to which Congress may circumvent the Treason Clause. 
 Of course, Chief Justice Stone was in the minority, and Justice 
Jackson wrote the opinion of the Court in Cramer. In doing so, Jus-
tice Jackson adopted a more exacting interpretation of the overt act 
requirement and made explicitly clear that Congress possessed great 
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freedom to criminalize conduct that could also be punished as trea-
son under different headings and without the same procedural safe-
guards. As will be shown, the fact that Justice Jackson’s views car-
ried the day would have a lasting and significant impact on the fu-
ture of treason prosecutions in the United States. 
V.   THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM REGARDING THE LACK
OF TREASON PROSECUTIONS AFTER 1954 
 After a flurry of treason prosecutions during the 1940s and early 
1950s, including the prosecution of Anthony Cramer, the U.S. gov-
ernment did not indict a single person for treason between 1954 and 
2006. The traditional explanation for the more than half-century ab-
sence of treason charges is that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cramer made treason too hard to prove, essentially leaving federal 
prosecutors without the option of bringing it as a charge. This Part 
further explores that commonly held view and identifies its funda-
mental weaknesses. 
A.   Prior Scholarship on the Disappearance of Treason Prosecutions 
 The first to argue that Cramer killed the treason charge was Pro-
fessor Corwin. In Total War and the Constitution, Corwin asserts 
that the Court’s opinion in Cramer “rema[de] the law of treason so 
far as concerns treason by adhering to an enemy of the United 
States,” that the decision would contribute to “the near elimination of 
treason from the calendar of provable crimes under the Constitu-
tion.”212 According to Corwin, the Court’s holding in Cramer set the 
bar so high that only the truly exceptional case could pass constitu-
tional muster. 
 Similarly, in a recent tribute to Justice Jackson, Phil Neal, the 
law clerk to Jackson who helped draft the Cramer opinion, observed 
that in “the Cramer treason case . . . [Justice Jackson] adopted a 
view of the Treason Clause that makes prosecutions for treason very 
difficult.”213 These are striking words from a person who helped draft 
the Cramer opinion and called it one of the “two efforts [as a clerk] 
that stand out most in my mind.”214
 Other commentators have likewise explained that Cramer forced 
the DOJ to prosecute individuals suspected of treason with substi-
tute crimes. For instance, Professor Wiecek asserts that the Court’s 
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“short leash on treason”215 “hedged in treason prosecutions with strict 
evidentiary requirements.”216 Because “treason was unavailable,” the 
DOJ had “to come up with substitutes.”217 Similarly, Professor How-
ard argues that Cramer “severely restricted [the] American law of 
treason,” and, as a result, “the government, bound by Cramer stan-
dards,” had to subsequently “employ[] lesser crimes against alleged 
internal enemies.”218
 This common narrative is not told just by lawyers and legal scho-
lars. After the recent Gadahn indictment, the Washington Post ob-
served that “[t]he decision to charge alleged al-Qaeda propagandist 
Adam Gadahn with treason is something of a gamble by the U.S. 
government.”219 This is because even though “Gadahn may be a suit-
able candidate for a treason charge, federal prosecutors may face se-
rious difficulties in securing a conviction if he is ever brought to trial.”220
 In a slight variation to the above account, Hurst proclaimed that 
Cramer’s lack of clarity, in addition to its “unreasonably narrow” 
holding, would “be as strong a deterrent [against prosecution] as any 
doctrine elicited from it.”221 Thus, the stringency of the Cramer stan-
dard, plus its perceived ambiguities, led Hurst to predict that “the 
majority opinion in Cramer v. United States has cast such a net of 
ambiguous limitations about the crime of ‘treason’ that it is doubtful 
whether a careful prosecutor will ever again chance an indictment 
under that head.”222
 In sum, most commentators have emphasized Cramer’s stringent 
interpretation of the overt act requirement when explaining why 
treason charges were no longer brought after the World War II era. 
According to these observers, the Court’s opinion in Cramer made 
treason too difficult to prove, causing treason prosecutions to essen-
tially disappear. 
                                                                                                                    
 215. William M. Wiecek, Sabotage, Treason, and Military Tribunals in World War II,
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R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002). 
 216. Id. at 56. 
 217. Id. at 60. Elsewhere, Wiecek has made the same observations about the effect of 
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 218. Howard, Cramer Treason Case, supra note 133, at 56-57, 59; see also Howard, su-
pra note 19, at 411. 
 219. Dan Eggen, Charge of Treason Difficult to Prove, Legal Experts Say, WASH. POST,
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 220. Id. The story also quoted Professor Bobby Chesney, “a specialist in national secu-
rity law,” who warned that no matter the apparent strength of the case against Gadahn, 
treason is “ ‘always a very difficult crime to prove.’ ” Id.
 221. HURST, supra note 8, at 207, 218. 
 222. Id. at 218. 
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B.   The Weaknesses of the Conventional Wisdom 
 The conventional wisdom’s explanation for the lack of treason 
prosecutions is particularly unconvincing in light of two post-Cramer
phenomena: (1) the DOJ’s decision to continue seeking treason 
indictments and bringing treason prosecutions in the decade 
immediately after Cramer; and (2) the treatment of these 
prosecutions, including subsequent interpretations of Cramer and 
the Treason Clause, by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
during this same time period. Both of these occurrences demonstrate 
that in the decade after Cramer, prosecutors and government 
officials could not have believed that treason prosecutions would be 
too difficult to bring; if anything, these developments counsel the 
opposite conclusion. 
 Between 1945 (the year Cramer was decided) and 1954, the DOJ 
brought close to a dozen treason prosecutions to trial. At least one 
American was indicted for treason each year from 1945 to 1949. 
Charges of treason were brought against Ezra Pound (indicted in 
1945),223 Robert Best (1946),224 Douglas Chandler (1946),225 Tomoya 
Kawakita (1947),226 Mildred Gillars (1948),227 Iva D’Aquino (1948),228
Martin Monti (1948),229 John Provoo (1949),230 and Herbert Burgman 
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 224. See Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 136 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 
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 225. See United States v. Chandler, 171 F.2d 921, 927 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 
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was charged with treason after the war. See Kawakita, 190 F.2d at 509. 
 227. See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Gillars was prosecuted 
for broadcasting on behalf of the German government. Id. at 966.  
 228. See D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 349 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 
U.S. 935 (1952). D’Aquino was prosecuted for broadcasting on behalf of the Japanese gov-
ernment. Id. at 348. 
 229. United States v. Monti, 100 F. Supp. 209, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). Monti, a former 
lieutenant, was charged with treason in connection with his conduct as an American sol-
dier in the European theater. NATHANIEL WEYL, TREASON: THE STORY OF DISLOYALTY AND 
BETRAYAL IN AMERICAN HISTORY 390, 392-96 (1950). “Monti stole an American combat 
plane and flew it behind German lines. He then tried hard to enroll in the Nazi Luft-
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(1949).231 The indictments against Pound, Best, and Chandler were 
even brought before the Court’s opinion in Haupt, the first time the 
Court affirmed a treason conviction in its history. 
 Clearly, the DOJ did not believe that Cramer had made treason 
prosecutions impossible, as the conventional wisdom indicates. Ra-
ther, it seems quite obvious that the DOJ believed treason, as it had 
been before Cramer, was still a viable option for federal prosecutors. 
It simply would not have made sense for the DOJ to continue bring-
ing treason charges if it thought they would be impossible to prove.  
 Interestingly, the defendants in these cases typically challenged 
their indictments or convictions on grounds other than that which 
served as the basis for reversal in Cramer. Instead, defendants
tended to argue that the court lacked jurisdiction, there was impro-
per venue, or the treason statute did not apply extraterritorially. For 
the most part, these defendants did not focus on the statements in 
Cramer about the overt act standard—the language that commenta-
tors would later claim doomed treason prosecutions. In the clearest 
example of lawyers at the time not believing treason prosecutions 
were impossible after Cramer, the lawyers for Martin Monti, who 
was indicted three years after Cramer, advised their client to plead 
guilty because he “had no legal defense to the charge of treason made 
against him.”232 Monti followed the advice and became the first Amer-
ican defendant to admit to treason in open court.233
 The courts also looked favorably on treason charges during this 
time. Indeed, every treason prosecution brought to trial resulted in a 
conviction, and every treason conviction but one was affirmed on  
appeal.234 Furthermore, when faced with an opportunity to interpret 
a different aspect of the Treason Clause or to apply the overt  
act standard of Cramer, courts almost always decided in favor of  
the government.  
 For example, in Haupt, the Supreme Court affirmed a treason 
conviction and held that the overt acts alleged met the standard an-
                                                                                                                    
waffe . . . .” Id. at 392. Because the Germans distrusted his motives, they took him as a 
prisoner of war, but used the plane in which he arrived. Id. at 393. 
 230. See United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 533 (2d Cir. 1954). Provoo, a sergeant 
in the Pacific theater, was captured as a prisoner of war. Id. at 532. He was prosecuted for 
treason for allegedly offering his services to the Japanese military while a prisoner, mak-
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 231. See United States v. Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568 (D.D.C. 1949), aff’d, 188 F.2d 637 
(D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 838 (1951). Burgman was prosecuted for broadcast-
ing on behalf of the German government. Id. at 569. 
 232. Monti, 100 F. Supp. at 212-13. 
 233. WEYL, supra note 229, at 396. 
 234. See generally opinions cited in supra notes 223-31. 
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nounced in Cramer.235 If it so desired, the Court could have plausibly 
held that Cramer required a reversal; however, the Court found the 
acts alleged to have given sufficient aid and comfort to the enemy.236
Haupt also challenged some of the overt acts on the grounds that 
they did not satisfy the Treason Clause’s two-witness requirement.237
The Court dismissed the argument, holding that “while two wit-
nesses must testify to the same act, it is not required that their tes-
timony be identical.”238
 The Supreme Court once again signaled it was not hostile to trea-
son charges when it affirmed the conviction of Tomoya Kawakita in 
1952. There, the Court held that the overt acts at issue were suffi-
cient under Cramer.239 The Court also rejected the defendant’s claim 
that he could not be prosecuted for treason because he had previously 
renounced his American citizenship and thus did not owe allegiance 
to the United States when he committed the alleged overt acts. Al-
though three Justices agreed with Kawakita on this threshold issue, 
a majority found that he was still a United States citizen and could 
be prosecuted for treason.240 The Court, as it did in Haupt, also read 
the two-witness requirement fairly leniently, holding that even 
though “there was a variance as to details,” the testimonies at issue 
satisfied the two-witness requirement.241
 Following the Supreme Court’s lead, lower federal courts consis-
tently affirmed treason convictions after Cramer and rejected chal-
lenges based on jurisdiction, venue, and extraterritoriality.242 In the 
ten years immediately following Cramer, only one treason conviction 
was reversed on appeal. In 1954, the Second Circuit overturned the 
conviction of John Provoo and held that the lower federal court was 
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 237. See id. at 640. 
 238. Id. Justice Jackson offered the following hypothetical in explaining the Court’s holding: 
One witness might hear a report, see a smoking gun in the hand of defendant 
and see the victim fall. Another might be deaf, but see the defendant raise and 
point the gun, and see a puff of smoke from it. The testimony of both would cer-
tainly be ‘to the same overt act,’ although to different aspects. 
Id.
 239. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 738-39 (1952) (holding that the overt 
acts “plainly gave aid and comfort to the enemy in the constitutional sense”). 
 240. Id. at 732-33; see id. at 745-46 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 241. Id. at 742 (majority opinion). 
 242. See, e.g., D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); Burgman v. 
United States, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 
1950); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United States, 
171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948). 
680 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:635 
an improper venue and that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
admission of evidence that should have been disallowed.243
 Notably, after Cramer, no other treason conviction was reversed 
for failing to meet the overt act requirement. If anything, Cramer 
proved to be more the exception than the rule.  
 The combination of these two post-Cramer phenomena—the fre-
quency with which the DOJ brought treason prosecutions and the 
willingness of courts to affirm treason convictions—made it seem at 
the time as if treason was here to stay. Indeed, at least one observer 
writing in 1951 predicted that “the nature of our present national 
and world crisis is such that the concept of treason is likely to take 
on much greater importance in the future.”244
 At the very least, these facts cast doubt on the assertion that the 
Court’s interpretation of the overt act requirement in Cramer was 
solely responsible for the disappearance of treason prosecutions. The 
next Part offers an alternative explanation as to why treason charges 
fell out of favor with federal prosecutors after 1954. 
VI.   REASSESSING WHY THERE WERE NO TREASON 
PROSECUTIONS AFTER 1954 
 Although the traditional account correctly identifies the Court’s 
decision in Cramer as a contributing factor to the disappearance of 
treason prosecutions after 1954, the decision’s precise role is not how 
the conventional wisdom portrays it. To be sure, the overt act stan-
dard adopted in Cramer is significant. At the same time, however, 
the conventional wisdom overlooks an equally important passage in 
Cramer that helps explain the decline of treason charges. Moreover, 
as discussed in more detail below, the Court’s decision was not the 
sole factor responsible. Instead, it was a combination of the Court’s 
opinion in Cramer, Congress, and prosecutorial discretion that led to 
the lack of treason charges after 1954. 
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A.   Cramer, Congress, and Prosecutorial Discretion 
 The significance of Cramer to the eventual decline of treason 
prosecutions is two-fold. First, the Court’s decision made treason 
harder to prove than most other options available to prosecutors. It is 
not that treason was made too hard to prove, but rather that it was 
made harder to prove. The distinction may be a fine one, but it is 
significant. A rational prosecutor will likely bring the charges that 
are easiest to prove, so long as they provide adequate punishment. 
Thus, when choosing between a treason and nontreason charge, the 
prosecutor will most likely bring whichever is easier to prove. When 
the Court rejected the government’s conspiracy analogy in Cramer, it 
made treason harder to prove than the average charge typically 
available to a federal prosecutor. To be clear, this is different than 
saying treason became impossible (or too hard) to prove after Cra-
mer. As can be seen from the cases decided after Cramer, it was still 
possible to prosecute and convict someone of treason. In fact, it hap-
pened nearly a dozen times.245
 This model of prosecutorial decisionmaking, where a prosecutor 
will bring charges for the easier-to-prove crime (all other things be-
ing equal), presumes that more than one criminal statute covers the 
same conduct. This is typically not a problem in our criminal law: 
multiple statutes apply to the same conduct all the time. When it 
comes to treason, however, some, like Chief Justice Stone, believe 
that the Treason Clause limits the options available to Congress and 
the prosecutor. If conduct prohibited by the treason statute (and 
therefore the Treason Clause) can only be punished as treason, and 
not under a separate statute, then the prosecutorial model above is 
irrelevant because the prosecutor can only bring that one charge. 
But, if Congress can prohibit (and the Executive can prosecute) trea-
sonous conduct under headings other than treason, then this deci-
sionmaking model retains its predictive power.  
 This leads to the second significant aspect of the Cramer opinion: 
the Court explicitly stated that Congress could punish treasonous 
conduct under a different heading and without the procedural safe-
guards required by the Treason Clause.246 As discussed in Part IV, 
some of the Justices in Cramer were quite concerned about the possi-
bility of congressional circumvention of the Treason Clause—so much 
so that their interpretations of the overt act requirement were influ-
enced by their views on this matter.  
 However, Justice Jackson, the author of the Cramer opinion, did 
not share these qualms. Instead, Jackson defended the Court’s opi-
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nion in Cramer partly on the ground that the government could al-
ways bring other charges if it believed the charge of treason would be 
too difficult to make in a particular case: 
The Government has urged that our initial interpretation of the 
treason clause should be less exacting, lest treason be too hard to 
prove and the Government disabled from adequately combating 
the techniques of modern warfare. But the treason offense is not 
the only nor can it well serve as the principal legal weapon to vin-
dicate our national cohesion and security. In debating this provi-
sion, Rufus King observed to the Convention that the ‘controversy 
relating to Treason might be of less magnitude than was supposed; 
as the legislature might punish capitally under other names than 
Treason.’ His statement holds good today. Of course we do not in-
timate that Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule 
merely by giving the same offense another name. But the power of 
Congress is in no way limited to enact prohibitions of specified acts 
thought detrimental to our wartime safety. The loyal and the dis-
loyal alike may be forbidden to do acts which place our security in 
peril, and the trial thereof may be focussed [sic] upon defendant’s 
specific intent to do those particular acts thus eliminating the ac-
cusation of treachery and of general intent to betray which have 
such passion-rousing potentialities. Congress repeatedly has 
enacted prohibitions of specific acts thought to endanger our secu-
rity and the practice of foreign nations with defense problems more 
acute than our own affords examples of others.247
Justice Jackson then cited to a variety of different statutes that pro-
hibited conduct also covered by treason as examples of other charg-
ing options available to the government.248 By stating, albeit in dicta, 
that the Court would permit the DOJ to prosecute people like Cra-
mer under these statutes without adhering to the procedural re-
quirements of the Treason Clause, this passage marks the second 
significant contribution of the Cramer opinion to the lack of treason 
prosecutions after 1954.249
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 While the Cramer opinion dealt with the issue of congressional 
circumvention only in passing, the issue was squarely presented in 
the prosecutions of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The Rosenbergs 
were prosecuted for conspiracy to commit espionage, not treason, for 
having disclosed atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.250 But that did 
not prevent the case from being viewed through the lens of treason. 
 For instance, in his opening statement, the United States Attor-
ney promised the jury that it would find the “evidence of the treason-
able acts of these three defendants . . . overwhelming” and claimed 
that the Rosenbergs had “ ‘committed the most serious crime which 
can be committed against the people of this country.’ ”251 During clos-
ing arguments, the prosecutor referred to the Rosenbergs as “trai-
tors” and said, “ ‘These defendants stand before you in the face of 
overwhelming proof of this terrible disloyalty.’ ”252 Even Judge Irving 
Kaufman, the trial judge in the case, conflated the two offenses at 
times. In explaining his rationale for sentencing the Rosenbergs to 
death, Judge Kaufman stated:  
I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians 
the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would 
perfect the bomb has already caused the Communist aggression in 
Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding fifty thousand and 
who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the 
price for your treason.253
Given such overtones, it was “hardly surprising that editorial writers 
and newspaper columnists all over the country seemed confused 
about the actual charge against the Rosenbergs or that so many took 
the occasion to urge the death penalty for treason.”254
 The Rosenbergs made several claims when appealing their convic-
tions to the Second Circuit, but chief among them was the argument 
that their convictions violated the Treason Clause: 
Their convictions under the Espionage Act should be reversed, it 
was argued, because they had been secured in violation of Article 
III, Section 3 of the Constitution . . . . The Rosenbergs had been 
charged with a conspiracy to commit espionage, not treason; but 
throughout the trial they had been branded by the government as 
‘traitors,’ and under the Espionage Act they had been convicted for 
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what amounted to treason without the constitutional safeguards 
required in a treason trial—above all the ‘two witness’ rule.255
The Second Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the convic-
tions.256 This rejection was not surprising since the Espionage Act, 
the statute under which the Rosenbergs were prosecuted, was one of 
the laws specifically cited by Justice Jackson in Cramer as an exam-
ple of permissible congressional intervention (or, what some might 
call, circumvention).257 On petition for certiorari, only Justice Black 
thought this issue merited review.258
 Thus, the Court in Rosenberg made clear what Cramer had essen-
tially already decided: it was permissible for prosecutors to indict 
someone on charges other than treason when a treason charge would 
not only have been possible but also appropriate. The lesson offered 
by Rosenberg and Cramer was that even if the offenses were similar 
(and perhaps interchangeable), the prosecutor was free to choose 
which crime to charge. Once it was clear that a prosecutor could 
bring charges other than treason for conduct also covered by the 
treason statute (and the Treason Clause), a rational prosecutor 
would most likely indict on the nontreason charge if it were easier to 
prove than a treason charge. This is true regardless of how difficult it 
would be to successfully prove treason, so as long as the treason 
charge was more difficult to prove than the nontreason option. 
 By 1954, Rosenberg and Cramer had firmly established that pros-
ecutors could bring nontreason charges without the procedural safe-
guards associated with treason, even if the conduct at issue could al-
so be punished as treason. Around that same time, the menu of fed-
eral crimes grew rapidly. Congress had recently passed the Internal 
Security Act of 1950259 and the Communist Control Act of 1954,260
and there was no slowing down in sight. As the number of federal 
statutes criminalizing conduct that could also be considered treason-
ous increased, it became less likely that a federal prosecutor would 
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bring a charge of treason given the array of options now available.261
In short, it was this combination of Cramer, Congress, and prosecu-
torial discretion that best accounts for the disappearance of treason 
prosecutions after 1954. 
B.   A Potential Critique and Another Explanation Considered 
1.   Why Did the DOJ Bring Treason Prosecutions After Cramer?
 A possible critique of my explanation for the lack of treason prose-
cutions after 1954 is that it fails to account for why the DOJ contin-
ued to bring treason prosecutions after Cramer, especially if treason 
was harder to prove than nontreason alternatives. Put another way, 
if a rational prosecutor would have preferred to bring nontreason 
charges when possible, why did the DOJ continue to bring treason 
charges in the decade following Cramer? The best explanation is in-
stitutional inertia. 
  Although most of the defendants prosecuted for treason between 
1945 and 1954 were formally indicted for treason after Cramer, many 
had also been initially indicted for treason prior to Cramer. For in-
stance, radio broadcasters Robert Best and Douglas Chandler were 
each originally indicted for treason in 1943.262 The DOJ was forced to 
seek new indictments for Best and Chandler, however, because of 
venue reasons. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3238, the “trial of all offenses 
begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the ju-
risdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in 
which the offender . . . is arrested or is first brought.”263 Best and 
Chandler were originally indicted in 1943 in Washington, D.C., but 
the plane transporting them from Germany to stand trial in the 
United States was forced to make an emergency landing in Massa-
chusetts, meaning the district into which they were “first brought” 
was the federal district of Massachusetts.264 This forced the DOJ to 
seek new indictments, which were returned in December 1946.265
While the DOJ was certainly free to indict these defendants on  
different charges, especially if it believed treason to be too difficult  
to prove in light of Cramer, it is not surprising (given the institution-
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al inertia) that the government brought the same charges against 
these defendants. 
 Similarly, most of the Americans prosecuted for treason after 
Cramer, including the other broadcasters, were investigated for trea-
son prior to the Court’s decision in Cramer.266 It was not until new 
cases arose, ones that were not yet in the system as treason cases 
when Cramer was decided, that the impact of prosecutorial discretion 
in favor of nontreason charges was fully realized. 
 In addition, to the extent there were any lingering doubts about 
the government’s ability to bring substitute charges in lieu of trea-
son, such uncertainty was eliminated after the Rosenberg decision in 
1952. After that time, it was clear that prosecutors could use any op-
tion in the full arsenal of federal criminal law regardless of whether 
a charge of treason could be brought as well. 
 In sum, although the DOJ continued to bring treason prosecutions 
in the decade immediately after Cramer, it did so only in cases that 
were already being investigated as treason prior to the Court’s deci-
sion. For later cases not affected by such institutional inertia, the 
impact of Cramer—both its exacting overt act requirement and its 
explicit permission to bring other charges for treason-like conduct—
was fully felt. 
2.   Another Explanation Rejected: The Absence of a Formal 
Declaration of War 
 A different explanation that has been offered for the lack of trea-
son prosecutions (besides the theory that Cramer made treason too 
hard to prove) is that a person can only commit treason when there 
has been a formal declaration of war by Congress, and there has been 
no such declaration since World War II. For the reasons discussed 
below, this explanation is based on a faulty premise and therefore 
cannot accurately account for the disappearance of treason prosecu-
tions after 1954. 
 Under the Treason Clause, a person may be convicted of treason if 
he adhered to an enemy of the United States and provided aid and 
comfort to that enemy.267 Thus, determining whether (and when) 
                                                                                                                    
 266. See supra note 262 and accompanying text; see also Draft Indictment dated July 
1943, Douglas Chandler FBI File, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Record 
Group 65, Box 77, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [hereinafter Chandler 
File]; Letter to SAC from Director J. Edgar Hoover dated June 11, 1943, Chandler File, su-
pra; FBI Report from Baltimore Field Office dated July 7, 1945, Chandler File, supra.
 267. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. (“Treason against the United States, shall con-
sist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid 
and Comfort.”). Of course, there need not be an “enemy” in order to be convicted of levying 
war against the United States. 
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someone may be considered an enemy of the United States is an es-
sential threshold inquiry for any prosecution under the giving aid 
and comfort prong of the Treason Clause. According to this “formal 
declaration” explanation, an enemy exists (and thus treason can be 
committed) only when there has been a formal declaration of war. No 
formal declaration means no “enemy,” which, in turn, means no trea-
son prosecution. 
 Professor George Fletcher recently set forth this view when he 
predicted, in 2004, that “the government will probably not bring 
another treason prosecution for many years to come, if ever.”268
Fletcher based his forecast on the fact that “Congress now delegates 
military authority to the President without declaring war.”269 Accord-
ing to Fletcher, “the concept of ‘enemy’ applies only to enemies in a 
declared war.”270 Thus, absent a formal declaration of war, there 
could be no enemy, and, absent an enemy, a person could not commit 
treason. For Fletcher, the fact that there have been no formal decla-
rations of war since World War II explained why, as of the time of his 
writing, there had been no treason prosecutions since 1954.271
 As support for the notion that the concept of “enemy” applies only 
when there has been a formal declaration of war, Fletcher refers to 
what he calls a “persuasive line of cases.”272 He cites, however, only 
two lower court opinions:273 United States v. Fricke274 and United 
States v. Greathouse.275 Upon further examination, these cases offer 
Fletcher only minimal support. For instance, in Fricke, the court 
merely observed that “the subjects of the Emperor of Germany were 
enemies of the United States” upon the outbreak of hostilities be-
tween the United States and Germany.276 The court in Fricke did not 
state that a declaration of war was necessary but rather that the 
“breaking out of the war between the United States and the Imperial 
German Government” made all subjects of Germany enemies of the 
United States.277 In Greathouse, the court held that the confederate 
                                                                                                                    
 268. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1627. 
 269. Id. (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 
Stat. 224, 224 (2001)). 
 270. Id. at 1612. Fletcher is not alone in making such an argument. See, e.g., Stein-
haus, supra note 13, at 272 (noting that “it appears doubtful” that someone could  
be prosecuted for treason during the Korean War “as no state of war officially existed for 
this purpose”). 
 271. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1626. 
 272. Id. at 1612. 
 273. See id. at 1612 n.10. 
 274. 259 F. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). 
 275. 26 F. Cas. 18 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863). 
 276. Fricke, 259 F. at 675. 
 277. Id.
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“rebels” were not enemies for the purpose of the Treason Clause.278
Like Fricke, it did not base its decision on the presence or absence of 
a formal declaration of war. Rather, the court held that the term 
“enemies” as used in the Treason Clause “applies only to the subjects 
of a foreign power in a state of open hostility with us. It does not em-
brace rebels in insurrection against their own government.”279 Thus, 
the court based its decision on the fact that the Confederacy was not 
a foreign power—not on the absence of a formal declaration of war.280
 Even if one were to read these two cases in the light most suppor-
tive of Fletcher, they are of significantly less importance in the post-
World War II era. This is because countries, including the United 
States, no longer declare wars; indeed, “despite hundreds of armed 
conflicts around the world . . . , some of them quite intense and pro-
longed, it appears that no nation has declared war since the late 
1940s.”281 As Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith recog-
nize, “the relevant jurisdictional concept” for such hostilities is no 
longer “war” but rather “armed conflict.”282 Indeed, “declarations of 
war [now] serve little purpose under international law.”283 Given this 
shift away from declarations of war, it is unsurprising that both 
courts and Congress have accepted that “Congress need not issue a 
formal declaration of war in order to provide its full authorization for 
the President to prosecute a war.”284
 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld285
erased any lingering doubt about this last point. In that case, the 
Court held that when Congress passed the Authorization for Use 
Military Force in 2001, it authorized the President to engage in cer-
tain “fundamental incident[s] of waging war.”286 This was true de-
spite the fact that there was no formal declaration of war by Con-
gress. Such fundamental incidents included the ability to detain 
enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities.287 If a congressional 
authorization to use military force can authorize the President to  
                                                                                                                    
 278. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. at 22-23. The court did recognize, however, that Confede-
rate rebels could be guilty of treason under the levying war prong of the Treason Clause. 
See id.
 279. Id. at 22. 
 280. See Holzer, supra note 261, at 223 (noting that Justice Field in Greathouse “chose 
the word ‘hostility,’ denoting a very different relationship: one not of war”). 
 281. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2061-62 (2005). 
 282. Id. at 2061 (noting also that the “United Nations Charter, which now regulates 
the portion of the international laws of war known as jus ad bellum, refers not to ‘war,’ but 
rather to ‘armed attack,’ ‘use of force,’ and ‘threat[s] to the peace’ ”). 
 283. Id.
 284. Id. at 2062. 
 285. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 286. Id. at 519.  
 287. See id. at 518-20. 
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detain enemy combatants absent a declaration of war, such authori-
zations surely must also satisfy the enemy requirement of the Trea-
son Clause. In short, if a person can be treated as an enemy comba-
tant without a declaration of war, it would make little sense for that 
same person not to be considered an enemy for the purposes of the 
Treason Clause.288
 While some commentators have suggested that treason requires a 
formal declaration of war, many more have argued to the contrary. A 
note published in the Columbia Law Review in 1956 observed that 
under “all existing authority,” the Chinese and North Korean forces 
were an “enemy” during the Korean conflict for the purposes of the 
Treason Clause.289 Indeed, the note asserted that several “acts of 
prisoner misconduct,” such as collaborating with or providing infor-
mation to the enemy, “could be subsumed under treason” and tried in 
civilian court.290
 During the Vietnam conflict a decade later, Captain Jabez W. 
Loane, IV, a member of the U.S. Army’s Judge Advocate General, 
opined that while “[t]he offense of treason by aiding the enemy can 
only be committed during time of war[,] . . . it does not necessarily 
follow that the war must be attired with all the customary trim-
mings, such as a formal declaration.”291 Notably, Captain Loane 
made this observation immediately after discussing the Greathouse
case and even cited to the Fricke case as support for his own view.292
Loane went so far as to find that “the civil offense of treason and its 
military counterpart of aiding the enemy could well be committed in 
an escalated ‘cold war’ situation.”293
 More recently, Professor Bell observed that “though courts have 
yet to address the issue, it appears quite likely that a defendant who 
adheres to terrorist enemies of the U.S. may be found guilty of trea-
son” even if Congress has not formally declared war.294 This is be-
cause the Treason Clause “defines treason against the U.S. simply as 
‘adhering to [its] Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.’ It adds no 
                                                                                                                    
 288. See Tom W. Bell, Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 999, 1019-20 (2005) (asserting that the Court’s decision in Hamdi “strongly suggests 
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requirement that the U.S. officially declare war against those ene-
mies.”295 As Bell points out, “[i]f the Founders meant to limit ‘Ene-
mies’ of the U.S. to those against whom the U.S. has declared War, 
they certainly passed up an obvious opportunity to do so.”296
 Although courts have not yet had the opportunity to expressly de-
termine whether a person can commit treason absent a formal decla-
ration of war, they have consistently approved, absent a formal dec-
laration of war, various charges and convictions (mostly involving 
soldiers) that required the existence of an enemy under other statutes.  
 With respect to the Korean War, there are numerous cases in 
which courts approved prosecutions of soldiers that relied on the ex-
istence of an enemy even though there was no formal declaration of 
war. For instance, in Dickenson v. Davis,297 a federal district court 
denied the habeas petition of a soldier who had been charged and 
convicted by a military court-martial for the offenses of communicat-
ing with the enemy and informing on other prisoners while he was a 
prisoner of war in Korea.298 Similarly, the U.S. Army Board of Review 
and Court of Military Appeals upheld a number of convictions of sol-
diers who had been charged with “aiding the enemy” or “communi-
cating with the enemy” in violation of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.299 In addition, when asked to decide whether the Korean  
conflict constituted a “state of war” or “time of war” for the purposes 
of determining various legal obligations, courts consistently held that 
it did.300
                                                                                                                    
 295. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 296. Id. Like Bell, Professor Holzer answers the question of “whether one can be con-
victed of treason absent a formal declaration of war” in the affirmative. See Holzer, supra
note 261, at 222. Indeed, the purpose of Holzer’s article is to show that at least four Ameri-
cans could have—and, in his eyes, should have—been prosecuted for treason in connection 
with their conduct during the Korean, Vietnam, or Afghanistan wars (all of which were 
waged without a formal declaration). 
 297. 143 F. Supp. 421 (D. Kan. 1956). 
 298. The court also rejected petitioner’s claim that under the Constitution’s Treason 
Clause he could only have been tried for treason in a civilian court. Id. at 426. The court re-
jected this claim not because it found treason to be an unviable alternative but rather 
simply because “an accused has no constitutional right to choose the offense or the tribunal 
in which he will be tried.” Id.
 299. See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 22 C.M.R. 250, 260 (C.M.A. 1957) (affirming con-
viction for providing aid and comfort to the enemy); United States v. Batchelor, 22 C.M.R. 
144, 162 (C.M.A. 1956) (affirming conviction for communicating with the enemy); United 
States v. Bayes, 22 C.M.R. 487, 494 (A.B.R. 1956) (affirming conviction for providing aid 
and comfort to the enemy); United States v. Fleming, 19 C.M.R. 438, 451 (A.B.R. 1955) (af-
firming the conviction for providing aid and comfort to the enemy). In each of these cases, 
the enemy was North Korea. 
 300. See, e.g., United States v. Muldrow, 21 C.M.R. 493, 494 (A.B.R. 1956) (observing 
that it was “not disputed that there was a ‘time of war’ prior to 27 July 1953” and citing a 
number of cases as support); United States v. Smith, 17 C.M.R. 406, 407 (A.B.R. 1954) 
(holding that a “state of war has been held to have existed in Korea during the existence of 
hostilities” and citing a number of cases); Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 261 
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 Two particular Korean War cases merit further discussion. In 
Martin v. Young, an American soldier was charged with aiding the 
enemy in violation of Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice for his conduct as a prisoner of war in North Korea between 
1951 and 1953.301 Specifically, the military alleged, inter alia, that, as 
a prisoner of war, the soldier had collaborated with his captors and 
participated in communist propaganda aimed at promoting disloyalty 
and disaffection among the other American prisoners of war.302 The 
soldier asserted that the military court-martial currently detaining 
him lacked jurisdiction because he had been discharged prior to the 
charges being brought.303 A federal district court agreed and found 
that the soldier should be released since the military lacked jurisdic-
tion to charge and hold him.304 In so doing, however, the district court 
noted that the soldier, based on the conduct alleged, could still be 
tried in civilian court under “at least three criminal statutes,” includ-
ing that of treason.305
 In United States v. Powell,306 the defendants were charged with 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2388, which prohibited the interference or at-
tempted interference of American military objectives, for having dis-
tributed communist propaganda to American prisoners of war during 
the Korean conflict.307 Notably, during the trial, the court observed 
that “the evidence so far presented would be prima facie evidence of 
treason.”308 Though the case eventually resulted in a mistrial, these 
comments also demonstrate that the absence of a formal declaration 
of war was not viewed as a barrier to treason at the time. 
 With respect to prosecutions arising from the Vietnam War, 
courts once again approved charges and convictions that required the 
existence of an enemy even though there had been no formal declara-
tion of war. For instance, in United States v. Garwood, the U.S. 
Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction of a soldier who 
was charged with communicating with the enemy during the Viet-
                                                                                                                    
S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1953) (holding that the Korean conflict created a state of war and 
that “[u]ndoubtedly there may be war or a state of war without a declaration of war by the 
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war” even though Congress has not “formally declared” war). 
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nam War.309 Similarly, courts repeatedly held that the Vietnam con-
flict constituted a “time of war” and “state of war.”310 More recently, 
courts have also held that the Persian Gulf Conflict constituted a 
“time of war.”311
 Putting aside the merits of the declaration issue (which seem to 
strongly favor the position that a formal declaration is not necessary 
under the Treason Clause), the more important inquiry for our pur-
poses is whether prosecutors at the time believed that treason could 
only be charged if there had been a formal declaration of war by 
Congress. Based on the cases noted above, it is very unlikely that 
prosecutors would have believed that treason charges were not an 
option merely because Congress had not formally declared war. In-
deed, prosecutors were able to successfully convict a number of 
people under statutes that required the existence of an enemy, de-
spite no such declaration. Moreover, courts frequently and consis-
tently rejected claims made by defendants that they could not be 
convicted absent a formal declaration of war. Even if one were to go 
so far as to presume that those judicial decisions were erroneous, 
there is nothing to suggest that prosecutors acting at the time would 
have thought that treason, and treason alone, could not have been 
charged absent a formal declaration of war.  
 In sum, the contention that the absence of a formal declaration of 
war explains why prosecutors did not charge anyone with treason af-
ter 1954 is unpersuasive. Perhaps the strongest evidence of the 
weakness of this view is the Gadahn indictment. Congress has not 
formally declared war against al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organi-
zation. Nevertheless, the federal government brought charges of 
treason against Gadahn for aiding the enemy (al-Qaeda). Clearly, the 
prosecutors that indicted Gadahn did not believe that a formal decla-
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ration of war is needed to bring a charge of treason, and, based on 
the foregoing, it is doubtful that prosecutors ever believed it was.312
C.   Implications and Consequences 
 For the reasons discussed earlier, Cramer’s contribution to the 
lack of treason prosecutions was that it made treason relatively 
harder to prove and, at the same time, gave Congress and prosecu-
tors explicit permission to bring charges under the heading of espio-
nage, sedition, trading with the enemy, or some other similar substi-
tute, even if the conduct was essentially treason. 
                                                                                                                    
 312. In addition to this formal declaration of war rationale, Fletcher suggests “that 
there is a deeper reason” for the lack of treason prosecutions in the last half-century. 
Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1627. Specifically, Fletcher argues that treason represents a 
now-outmoded way of legal thinking: “Treason belongs to an era in which crimes were un-
derstood primarily as personal moral dramas”—an era in which “crime and treason were 
emblematic of moral struggles between the community and the deviant.” Id. at 1627-28. 
According to Fletcher:  
treason has declined because in the pragmatic thinking of the West, we no 
longer perceive great symbolic messages in criminal action. We now think im-
personally about crime and danger. The criminal does not betray us. He or she 
threatens us with physical harm. The decline of treason expresses a general 
shift in our culture away from symbolic struggles toward the systematic and 
scientific control of violence. 
Id. at 1628.  
 As the recent indictment of Gadahn demonstrates, however, treason has not lost all 
its resonance in American legal culture. Similarly, some have suggested that the American 
Taliban John Walker Lindh should have been prosecuted for treason for levying war 
against the United States. See, e.g., Holzer, supra note 261, at 181. Thus, it seems doubtful 
that treason is a crime that is confined to some bygone era. In addition, I believe Fletcher’s 
suggestion that there has been a “shift in our culture away from symbolic struggles” is 
somewhat overblown. Perhaps the best example of a symbolic gesture in connection with 
our criminal justice system is the treason indictment of Gadahn in 2006. At the time of the 
indictment, Gadahn was not in American custody. Indeed, his whereabouts remain un-
known to this day. Nevertheless, the federal government sought an indictment against 
Gadahn and even held a press conference to announce the return of the indictment. It 
seems quite plausible that the Gadahn indictment, as well as its public announcement, 
was motivated at least in part by its symbolic message: such behavior is treasonous and 
will not be tolerated. This seems like just the sort of “great symbolic message” that Fletch-
er indicates no longer exists in our criminal law.  
 Finally, there is a problem with Fletcher’s explanation in terms of timing. Even if 
Fletcher’s argument is credible with respect to the last several years, it does little to ex-
plain why there were no treason prosecutions in connection with the Korean or Vietnam 
Wars. If one presumes, as I think it is fair to do, that conduct which was treated like trea-
son during World War II occurred during these two later conflicts, it seems quite unlikely 
that the deeper reason for this absence of treason charges is some fundamental shift in 
how people think about crime and justice. This is because I find it nearly implausible, 
based on the short passage of time, that prosecutors in the late 1940s would have viewed 
treason in a fundamentally different way than prosecutors in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 Despite my disagreements with Fletcher, I do agree with him about one thing: “the 
government has a whole array of other offenses at its disposal, all of which are easier to 
prove in court than is treason.” Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1627. 
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 This latter contribution—concerning the explicit permission to 
circumvent the Treason Clause—is an issue that has occasionally re-
surfaced. For instance, in United States v. Drummond, the Second 
Circuit rejected a claim that a conviction under the federal Espionage 
Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Treason Clause.313 In 
affirming the conviction, the court cited Rosenberg and Cramer as 
support for its holding that the Treason Clause does not apply to 
prosecutions under the Espionage Act, even if the defendant could 
have been prosecuted for treason instead.314 Although the govern-
ment did not charge the defendant with treason, it argued that the 
“evidentiary requirements of the Treason Clause were satisfied at de-
fendant’s trial,” leaving one to presume that treason charges could 
have been brought if the government so desired.315 The Second Cir-
cuit stated that although the government’s “argument has some me-
rit, there is no need to examine its validity.”316
 Decades later, in United States v. Rahman, several defendants 
were charged with seditious conspiracy for planning to bomb various 
spots in New York City and assassinate the President of Egypt.317
The seditious conspiracy statute prohibits two or more persons from 
“conspir[ing] to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or to levy war against [the United 
States].”318 Because seditious conspiracy includes levying war against 
the United States—i.e., conduct clearly considered treason—the de-
fendants argued that their convictions violated the Constitution since 
they were not tried pursuant to the Treason Clause’s procedural sa-
feguards.319 As further support for their argument, the defendants 
noted that they were sentenced under the treason guideline of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines after the sentencing judge 
found that it provided the most “suitable analogy to the seditious 
conspiracy offense.”320 Despite the similarities between treason and 
seditious conspiracy, and the use of the treason sentencing guideline, 
the Second Circuit rejected the claim and found no constitutional in-
firmity with the conviction.321
 Based on the views expressed by Chief Justice Stone during the 
Cramer deliberations, he likely would have been sympathetic to the 
arguments set forth by the defendants in Drummond and Rahman.
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Justices Black and Douglas likely would have been as well. Fifty 
years later, however, the law established by Justice Jackson in Cra-
mer on the circumvention issue is now settled. Even in a case involv-
ing a conviction for a crime nearly identical to treason (seditious con-
spiracy), and where the sentence was imposed pursuant to the trea-
son sentencing guideline, federal courts found little merit to a claim 
that the Treason Clause was transgressed. 
 Today it is clear that the Treason Clause has little force outside of 
actual treason prosecutions. But this has not always been the case. 
During the deliberations in Cramer, one of the most disputed issues 
was the degree to which the Treason Clause limited Congress’s abili-
ty to punish treasonous behavior under a different heading without 
the clause’s procedural requirements.322 Because Justice Jackson’s 
view prevailed in Cramer, however, the claims of defendants like 
Drummond and Rahman fall on deaf ears. Perhaps more important-
ly, a scenario that would require prosecutors to bring charges of trea-
son rather than some other charge with lesser procedural demands is 
virtually nonexistent. 
VII.   CONCLUSION
 A reassessment of modern treason jurisprudence, especially in 
light of the recent Gadahn indictment, has been long overdue. Any 
such reassessment must begin with an examination of the Court’s 
most important decision regarding the law of treason: Cramer v. 
United States. This Article has argued that the conventional wisdom 
surrounding Cramer needs to be reconsidered. 
 First, the Justices in Cramer were motivated by broader prin-
ciples than those traditionally contemplated by the conventional wis-
dom. Indeed, the Justices’ views on the degree to which Congress 
may circumvent the Treason Clause and how difficult treason prose-
cutions should be go a long way in explaining why the Court divided 
as it did. Second, the traditional account for the decline in treason 
prosecutions misreads Cramer’s contribution. Instead of making 
treason too hard to prove, Cramer is significant because (1) it made 
treason harder to prove; and (2) it permitted (and, to some degree, 
invited) Congress to adopt alternative criminal statutes and prosecu-
tors to bring substitute charges. As a result, until the indictment of 
Gadahn, treason prosecutions disappeared for over fifty years. 
 It is not yet clear what the Gadahn indictment portends for trea-
son prosecutions in the future—whether it should be viewed as an 
anomaly or as a harbinger of things to come. Indeed, its significance 
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depends largely on whether Gadahn is ever captured and tried. What 
is clear, however, is that the law of treason is no longer dead. 
